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Abstract
We analyze the computational complexity of Halpern and Pearl’s (causal) explanations in the
structural-model approach, which are based on their notions of weak and actual cause. In particular,
we give a precise picture of the complexity of deciding explanations, α-partial explanations, and
partial explanations, and of computing the explanatory power of partial explanations. Moreover, we
analyze the complexity of deciding whether an explanation or an α-partial explanation over certain
variables exists. We also analyze the complexity of deciding explanations and partial explanations
in the case of succinctly represented context sets, the complexity of deciding explanations in the
general case of situations, and the complexity of deciding subsumption and equivalence between
causal models. All complexity results are derived for the general case, as well as for the restriction
to the case of binary causal models, in which all endogenous variables may take only two values.
To our knowledge, no complexity results for explanations in the structural-model approach have
been derived so far. Our results give insight into the computational structure of Halpern and Pearl’s
explanations, and pave the way for efficient algorithms and implementations.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Causal model; Probabilistic causal model; Weak cause; Explanation; α-partial explanation; Partial
explanation; Explanatory power; Complexity
✩ This paper is an extended and revised version of a paper that appeared in: Proceedings of the 8th International
Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR 2002), Morgan Kaufmann, San
Francisco, CA, 2002, pp. 49–60.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: eiter@kr.tuwien.ac.at (T. Eiter), lukasiewicz@dis.uniroma1.it (T. Lukasiewicz).
0004-3702/$ – see front matter  2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2003.06.002
146 T Eiter, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 154 (2004) 145–198
1. IntroductionThe automatic generation of explanations plays an important role in many AI areas
like planning, diagnosis, natural language processing, and probabilistic inference. Notions
of explanations have been studied quite extensively in the literature, see especially [21,
28,45] for philosophical work, and [29,33,48] for work in AI that is related to Bayesian
networks. A critical examination of such approaches from the viewpoint of explanations in
probabilistic systems is given in [6].
In a recent paper [25,27], Halpern and Pearl introduced an elegant definition of causal
explanation in the structural-model approach, which is based on their notions of weak and
actual cause [25,26]. They showed that this notion of causal explanation models well many
problematic examples in the literature. The main idea is that an explanation is a fact that
is not known for certain but, if found to be true, would constitute a cause of the fact to be
explained, regardless of the agent’s initial uncertainty. An important note is that Halpern
and Pearl’s notion of causal explanation is very different from the concepts of causal
explanation which have been considered in other works in AI, e.g., in [22,23,37,38,50].
Informally, the basic idea behind the structural-model approach is that the world is
modeled by random variables, which may causally influence each other. The variables are
divided into background variables, which are influenced by factors outside the model, and
observable variables, which are influenced by background and observable variables. This
latter influence is described by functions for the observable variables. The following is a
simple example due to Halpern and Pearl [25–27], which illustrates the structural-model
approach.
Example 1.1 (Arsonists). Suppose two arsonists lit matches in different parts of a dry
forest, and both cause trees to start burning. Assume now either match by itself suffices
to burn down the whole forest. We may model such a scenario in the structural-model
framework as follows. We assume two binary background variables U1 and U2, which
determine the motivation and the state of mind of the two arsonists, where Ui is 1 iff
arsonist i intends to start a fire. We then have three binary variables A1, A2, and B , which
describe the observable situation, where Ai is 1 iff arsonist i drops the match, and B is
1 iff the whole forest burns down. The causal dependencies between these variables are
expressed by functions, which say that the value of Ai is given by the value of Ui , and
that B is 1 iff either A1 or A2 is 1. These dependencies can be graphically represented as
in Fig. 1.
Causes and explanations for events, such as B = 1 (the whole forest burns down), are
defined by considering the values of variables in the above model and certain hypothetical
variants (see Sections 2.2, 3.1, and 4.1). For example, arsonist 1 starting a fire is a (weak
and an actual) cause of the whole forest burning down under every possible context in
which arsonist 1 intends to start a fire. Moreover, arsonist 1 starting a fire is an explanation
Fig. 1. Causal graph.
T Eiter, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 154 (2004) 145–198 147
of the whole forest burning down relative to the set of all possible contexts in which either
arsonist intends to start a fire.
For more examples and extensive background on structural causal models, we refer
especially to [2,20,24,40,41].
While the semantic aspects of explanations in the structural-model approach have been
thoroughly studied in [25,27], a study of their computational properties is missing so far.
In their papers, Halpern and Pearl were not concerned with algorithms for computing
explanations, and thus the issue of how explanations can be (as efficiently as possible)
computed remains to be considered. An important step towards resolving this issue is an
analysis of the computational complexity of explanations. However, no complexity results
for explanations, apart from trivial intractability results which are inherited from Boolean
functions, were known, and a characterization of the complexity of explanations was open.
In this paper, we aim at filling this gap by giving a precise account of the complexity
of explanations in structural causal models. It continues and extends the work in [14,18]
on the complexity of actual and weak causes, which are a stepping stone for defining
explanations. As for computation in the structural-model approach, Hopkins [30] recently
explored search-based strategies for computing actual causes (i.e., minimal weak causes)
in both the general and restricted settings. However, he did not pay much attention to
complexity issues, and did not provide a detailed analysis of the intrinsic complexity of
actual causes, nor did he address the computation of explanations on top of weak causes.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows (a review of the
mentioned complexity classes is given in Section 2.3):
• We determine the complexity of (full) explanations in the structural-model approach
[25,27]. We consider the problems of recognizing explanations and of deciding
whether an explanation over certain variables exists. As it turns out, these problems
are complete for DP2 and 
P
3 , respectively, in the unrestricted case, and complete
for DP and P2 , respectively, in the binary case. Thus, recognition and existence of
explanations reside, loosely speaking, at the second and the third level of the well-
known Polynomial Hierarchy.
• We then determine the complexity of partial explanations in the structural-model
approach [25,27], which relax full explanations in a probabilistic setting. We consider
the problems of recognizing α-partial/partial explanations, of deciding whether an α-
partial explanation over certain variables exists, and of computing the explanatory
power of partial explanations. These problems turn out to be complete for P
P
2‖ , P3 ,
and FP
P
2‖ , respectively, in the unrestricted case, and complete for PNP‖ , P2 , and FP
NP‖ ,
respectively, in the binary case.
• Furthermore, we analyze the complexity of explanations and partial explanations
in a setting where context sets are succinctly represented. In the standard setting,
the contexts u1, u2, . . . , un which ought to be respected for forming an explanation
are simply enumerated in the problem input. In another (natural) representation, the
contexts are given by a membership function χ(u), which on input of a context u
tells whether u ought to be respected or not. This form of representation is more
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succinct than simple context enumeration in general, and may lead to exponential
savings in storage for the context set of interest. However, this is traded for a significant
increase in the complexity of explanations. More precisely, we show that recognizing
explanations and partial explanations is complete for P4 in the unrestricted case, and
complete for P3 in the binary case.• Finally, we analyze the complexity of explanations in the generalization of contexts
to situations, which are pairs (M,u) of a causal model M and a context u [25,27];
here, also uncertainty about the causal model, and not only about the context which
applies to the actual scenario can be modeled. We consider the problems of recognizing
explanations and deciding explanation existence. We find that for the recognition
problem, moving from contexts to situations results in a complexity increase; as we
show, this problem is P3 -complete both in the unrestricted and the binary case. For
the existence problem, no complexity increase happens in general, i.e., the problem




• In our analysis of explanations for situations, we encounter and resolve problems
on structural causal models which are interesting in their own right. Namely, we
consider the problems of subsumption and equivalence between causal models M1
and M2 modulo the language of causal formulas [25,27]. That is, given M1 and M2,
is it true that each causal formula φ which holds on M1 also holds on M2 (denoted
M1  M2), respectively that M1 and M2 model the same set of causal formulas
(denotedM1 ≡M2), and thus are indistinguishable in the language of causal formulas.
As we show, both deciding M1 M2 and deciding M1 ≡M2 is P3 -complete, in the
unrestricted and, noticeably, also in the binary case. Both membership in P3 and
hardness for P3 are not immediate, and require suitable auxiliary results which help
to distinguish causal models.
Our results in the present paper draw a precise picture of the complexity of explanations
in the structural-model approach, and are valuable and important in several respects:
• First and foremost, they provide a handle in understanding the computational nature of
explanations and the intrinsic difficulties which are at the heart of their computation.
They must be reflected somehow in the worst-case behavior of “optimal” algorithms
solving the problem. In this way, our results contribute in paving the way for efficient
algorithms and for implementations of explanations in the structural-model approach.
• Second, the insight into sources of complexity which make the problems intractable
provides a starting point for identifying cases of lower complexity, and in particular of
tractable cases. While we do not purse this issue here, results on this can be found in
[15,16].
• Third, the results are useful in comparing Halpern and Pearl’s notion of causal
explanation with other notions of explanations (e.g., abductive explanations [12,35,47]
and maximum a posteriori explanations, alias most probable explanations in Bayesian
networks [33,34]), and allow to assess the existence of efficient mappings between
different frameworks for generating explanations.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some preliminaries on
structure-based causal models, the notion of weak cause, and the complexity classes that
we encounter in this paper. In Section 3, we analyze the complexity of full explanations
in the structural-model approach. Section 4 concentrates on the complexity of partial
explanations. In Section 5, we then analyze the complexity of explanations in the case of
succinctly represented context sets. Section 6 deals with the complexity of explanations
and of related problems in the general case of situations. In Section 7, we discuss
related work on other frameworks of explanations, and compare our results to complexity
results for them. Section 8 gives a discussion of the results, in particular of implications
for algorithms, and provides some concluding remarks, including an outlook on future
research issues.
While several of the results are intuitive, their proofs (in particular, the hardness parts)
are nontrivial and technically quite involved. Thus, in order not to distract from the flow of
reading, some technical details are moved to Appendices A–D.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we give some technical preliminaries. We first recall structure-based
causal models and the notion of weak cause by Halpern and Pearl [25,26]. We then describe
the complexity classes that appear in our results.
2.1. Causal models
We start with recalling structure-based causal models; for a rich background, see
especially [2,20,24,40,41]. Roughly speaking, the main idea behind structure-based causal
models is that the world is modeled by random variables, which may have a causal
influence on each other. The variables are divided into exogenous variables, which are
influenced by factors outside the model, and endogenous variables, which are influenced
by exogenous and endogenous variables. This latter influence is described by structural
equations for the endogenous variables.
More formally, we assume a finite set of random variables. Capital letters U,V,W,
etc. denote variables and sets of variables. Each variable Xi may take on values from
a nonempty finite domain D(Xi). A value for a set of variables X = {X1, . . . ,Xn} is a
mapping x :X→ D(X1) ∪ · · · ∪D(Xn) such that x(Xi)∈D(Xi); for X = ∅, the unique
value is the empty mapping ∅. The domain of X, denoted D(X), is the set of all values
for X. Lower case letters x, y, z, etc. denote values for the sets of variables X,Y,Z, etc.,
respectively. Assignments of values to variables X = x are often abbreviated by the value
x . For Y ⊆ X and x ∈D(X), denote by x|Y the restriction of x to Y . For disjoint sets of
variables X,Y and values x ∈ D(X),y ∈ D(Y), denote by xy the union of x and y . As
usual, we often identify singletons {Xi} with Xi and their values x with x(Xi). We often
identify the values 0 and 1 with the classical truth values false and true, respectively.
We are now ready to define causal models. A causal model M is a triple (U,V,F ),
whereU is a finite set of exogenous variables, V is a finite set of endogenous variables with
U ∩ V = ∅, and F = {FX |X ∈ V } is a set of functions FX :D(PAX)→D(X) that assign
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a value of X to each value of the parents PAX ⊆U ∪V \ {X} of X. Every value u ∈D(U)
is also called a context. The parent relationship between the variables of M = (U,V,F )
is expressed by the causal graph for M , which is the directed graph that has U ∪ V as
the set of nodes, and a directed edge from X to Y iff X is a parent of Y , for all variables
X,Y ∈U ∪ V . A causal model M = (U,V,F ) is binary iff |D(X)| = 2 for all X ∈ V .
We focus here on the principal class of recursive causal models M = (U,V,F ); as
argued in [25], we do not lose much generality by concentrating on recursive causal
models. A causal modelM = (U,V,F ) is recursive, if its causal graph is a directed acyclic
graph. Equivalently, there exists a total ordering≺ on V such that Y ∈ PAX implies Y ≺X,
for all X,Y ∈ V . In recursive causal models, every assignment to the exogenous variables
U = u determines a unique value y for every set of endogenous variables Y ⊆ V , denoted
YM(u) (or simply Y (u)). In the following, M is reserved for denoting a recursive causal
model.
Example 2.1 (Arsonists continued). In our introductory example, the causal model M =
(U,V,F ) is given by U = {U1,U2}, V = {A1,A2,B}, and F = {FA1 ,FA2 , FB}, where
FA1 = U1, FA2 = U2, and FB = 1 iff A1 = 1 or A2 = 1. The causal graph for M is shown
in Fig. 1. As this graph is acyclic, M is recursive.
In a causal model, we may set endogenous variables X to a value x by an “external
action”. More formally, for any causal model M = (U,V,F ), set of endogenous variables
X⊆V , and value x∈D(X), the causal model MX=x = (U,V \X,FX=x), where FX=x =
{F ′Y | Y ∈ V \ X} and each F ′Y is obtained from FY by setting X to x , is a submodel of
M . We use Mx and Fx to abbreviate MX=x and FX=x , respectively, if X is understood
from the context. Similarly, for a set of endogenous variables Y ⊆ V , we write Yx(u) to
abbreviate YMx (u).
As for computation, we assume that in causal models M = (U,V,F ), where F = {FX |
X ∈ V }, every function FX :D(PAX)→D(X) with X ∈ V is computable in polynomial
time. The following proposition is then immediate.
Proposition 2.2. For all X,Y ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X), the values Y (u) and Yx(u), given
u ∈D(U), are computable in polynomial time.
2.2. Weak causes
We now recall the notion of weak cause from [25,26]. We first define events and the
truth of events in a causal model M = (U,V,F ) under a context u ∈D(U).
A primitive event is an expression of the form Y = y , where Y is an endogenous
variable1 and y is a value for Y . The set of events is the closure of the set of primitive
events under the Boolean operations ¬ and ∧ (that is, every primitive event is an event,
and if φ and ψ are events, then also ¬φ and φ ∧ψ).
1 Note that [17] also admitted exogenous variables in primitive events, while [25,26] does not. This does not
affect the complexity of explanations in the basic setting, but has some consequences for the generalization to
situations, as discussed in Section 6.
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The truth of an event φ in a causal model M = (U,V,F ) under a context u ∈D(U),
denoted (M,u) |= φ, is inductively defined as follows:
• (M,u) |= Y = y iff YM(u)= y;
• (M,u) |= ¬φ iff (M,u) |= φ does not hold;
• (M,u) |= φ ∧ψ iff (M,u) |= φ and (M,u) |=ψ .
Further operators ∨ and → are defined as usual, i.e., φ ∨ψ and φ→ψ stand for ¬(¬φ ∧
¬ψ) and ¬φ ∨ψ , respectively. We write φ(u) to abbreviate (M,u) |= φ. For X ⊆ V and
x ∈D(X), we use φx(u) as an abbreviation of (Mx,u) |= φ. For X = {X1, . . . ,Xk} ⊆ V
with k  1 and xi ∈D(Xi), we use X = x1 · · ·xk to abbreviate X1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧Xk = xk .
The following result follows immediately from Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.3. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X). Given u ∈ D(U) and an event φ, deciding
whether φ(u) and φx(u) (given x) hold can be done in polynomial time.
We are now ready to recall the notion of weak cause [25,26]. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a
causal model. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X), and let φ be an event. Then, X = x is a weak
cause of φ under u iff the following conditions hold:
(AC1) X(u)= x and φ(u).
(AC2) Some W ⊆ V \X and some x¯ ∈D(X) and w ∈D(W) exist such that:
(a) ¬φx¯w(u), and
(b) φxwzˆ(u) for all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and zˆ= Ẑ(u).
The following example illustrates the notion of weak cause.
Example 2.4 (Arsonists continued). Consider the context u1,1=(1,1) in which both
arsonists intend to start a fire. Then, A1 = 1, A2 = 1, and A1 = 1 ∧ A2 = 1 are weak
causes of B = 1. For instance, let us show that A1 = 1 is a weak cause of B = 1: (AC1)
bothA1 and B is 1 under u, (AC2(a)) if bothA1 andA2 are set to 0, then B has the value 0,
and (AC2(b)) if A1 is set to 1 and A2 to 0, then B is 1. Moreover, A1 = 1 (respectively,
A2 = 1) is the only weak cause of B = 1 under the context u1,0 = (1,0) (respectively,
u0,1 = (0,1)) in which only arsonist 1 (respectively, 2) intends to start a fire.
The following proposition characterizes irrelevant variables in weak causes.
Proposition 2.5. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈D(X), let φ
be an event, and let u ∈D(U). Let X0 ∈X such that in the causal graph for M , it holds
that X0 is not a predecessor of any variable in φ. Let X′ =X \ {X0} and x ′ = x|X′. Then,
X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff (i) X0(u)= x(X0) and (ii) X′ = x ′ is a weak cause
of φ under u.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. That is, (AC1) X(u) = x
and φ(u) hold, and (AC2) some W ⊆ V \ X, x¯ ∈ D(X), w ∈ D(W) exist such that (a)
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¬φx¯w(u) and (b) φxwzˆ(u) for all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and zˆ = Ẑ(u). In particular, (i) holds.
Moreover, X′(u) = x ′ and φ(u) hold. Since X0 is no predecessor of any variable in φ,
it also follows that (a) ¬φx¯ ′w′(u) and (b) φx ′w′ zˆ(u) hold for all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X ∪ W) and
zˆ= Ẑ(u), where x¯ ′ = x¯|X′, w′ =wx0, and x0 = x(X0). This shows that X′ = x ′ is a weak
cause of φ under u, and thus also (ii) holds.
(⇐) Assume that (i) and (ii) hold. Thus, X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of φ under u. That is,
(AC1) X′(u) = x ′ and φ(u) hold, and (AC2) some W ⊆ V \X′, x¯ ′ ∈ D(X′), w ∈ D(W)
exist such that (a) ¬φx¯ ′w(u) and (b) φx ′wzˆ(u) for all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X′ ∪W) and zˆ = Ẑ(u).
Since also X0(u) = x(X0), it holds that X(u) = x and φ(u). Furthermore, as X0 is no
predecessor of any variable in φ, it follows that (a) ¬φx¯ ′x0w′(u) and (b) φx ′x0w′ zˆ(u) for all
Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and zˆ= Ẑ(u), where w′ =w|(W\{X0}) and x0 = x(X0). Hence, X = x
is a weak cause of φ under u. ✷
We finally recall a result from [14,18], which shows that deciding weak cause is
complete for P2 (respectively, NP) in the general (respectively, binary) case. Note that
this result holds also when the domain D(X)= {1, . . . , nX} of each variable X ∈ U ∪ V is
implicitly specified by nX  1.
Theorem 2.6 (see [14,18]). Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ), X⊆V , x∈D(X),
u ∈ D(U), and an event φ, deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under u is
complete for P2 (respectively, NP) in the general (respectively, binary) case.
2.3. Complexity classes
We assume that the reader has some elementary background in complexity theory,
and is familiar with the concepts of polynomial-time solvability, NP, polynomial-time
transformations among problems, and hardness respectively completeness of a problem
for a complexity class, as can be found, e.g., in [31,32,39]. We now briefly recall the
complexity classes that we encounter in this paper.
We recall that the Polynomial Hierarchy (PH) contains the classes P1 = P, P1 = NP,
P1 = co-NP, Pk+1 = P
P
k , Pk+1 = NP
P
k , and Pk = co-Pk , for all k  1. They
informally model solving problems with an oracle for some other problem, which belongs
to the class shown in the superscript. For our concerns, it is convenient to assume that the
oracle can be called on instances of different problems from a suite of fixed problems in
the class, which does not affect the computational power. Each call to the oracle costs unit
time. In particular, P2 = PNP (respectively, P2 = NPNP) denotes the class of problems
decidable in polynomial time with the help of an NP oracle on a deterministic (respectively,
a nondeterministic) Turing machine. Intuitively, the computational power of the classes in
PH increases with each level k.
From these classes, further complexity classes have been derived. The class DPk =
{L×L′ | L ∈Pk ,L′ ∈Pk }, k  1, is the “conjunction” ofPk andPk ; in particular, DP1 is
the familiar class DP. The letter D is mnemonic for the fact that a problem in DPk can be seen
as the difference between two problems in Pk formally viewed as sets of Yes-instances.
Such problems can be easily solved with two calls to a Pk oracle, but are intuitively easier
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since the calls can be made independently of each other. On the other hand, the problems





k‖ , k  1, contains the decision problems which can be solved in polynomial
time with one round of parallel calls to a Pk oracle rather than calls in arbitrary order, and
is part of the Refined PH [51]. Intuitively, constraining the use of the oracle to one parallel
call of all queries restricts the computational power, since the outcome of an oracle call
cannot be taken into account for other oracle calls. It is known that constraining to parallel
oracle queries is tantamount to restricting the number of oracle calls, in arbitrary order, to
O(logn) many, where n is the size of the problem input, cf. [51].
According to the current belief in complexity theory, Fig. 2 shows a strict hierarchy of
inclusions.
For classifying problems that compute an output value (e.g., the set of atoms that are
entailed by a classical formula φ), function classes similar to the classes above have been
introduced (cf. [31,46]). Among these are FP, FPNP‖ = FP
P1‖ , and FP
Pk‖ , which are the
functional analogs of P, PNP‖ = P
P1‖ , and P
Pk , respectively. For further background on
these complexity classes, we refer to [31,32,39,46,51].
We remark that all classes C in Fig. 2 are closed under polynomial-time reductions,
i.e., if a problem  has a polynomial time transformation into a problem ′ from C,
then also  belongs to C. Furthermore, each C has complete problems under polynomial-
time transformations, including canonical variants of the satisfiability problem (SAT), i.e.,
deciding satisfiability of a Boolean formula φ. The latter is well-known NP-complete,
while its complement, deciding unsatisfiability of φ is co-NP-complete; deciding, given
two Boolean formulas φ1 and φ2, whether φ1 is satisfiable and φ2 is unsatisfiable is
complete for DP. More generally, a complete problem for the class Pk (respectively,
Pk ), k  1, is to decide the validity of a given quantified Boolean formula (QBF)
Q1X1Q2X2 . . .QkXk φ, where X1,X2, . . . ,Xk are sets of variables, Q1Q2 . . .Qk is a
sequence of alternating quantifiers ∃ and ∀ such that Q1 = ∃ (respectively,Q1 = ∀), and φ
is a Boolean formula over the variables in X1 ∪X2 ∪ · · · ∪Xk . Deciding, given two QBFs
Φ1 and Φ2 of the form Q1X1Q2X2 . . .QkXk φ with Q1 = ∃, whether Φ1 is valid and Φ2
is not valid is complete for the class DPk . Finally, given l such QBFs Φ1, . . . ,Φl , deciding
whether the number of valid formulas among Φ1, . . . ,Φl is even (respectively, computing




In this paper, unless stated otherwise, completeness for a decision class is with respect to
standard polynomial-time transformations. Completeness for a function class is understood
in terms of a natural generalization of polynomial time transformations: The problem P1
reduces to P2, if there are polynomial time functions f and g such that for each instance
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I1 of P1, the output for I1 is given by g(I1,P2(f (I1)))2; see [31,46] for formal details. In
case of P and FP, completeness is understood in terms of reductions that can be computed
in logarithmic space.
3. Explanations
In this section, we analyze the complexity of (full) explanations in the structural-model
approach due to Halpern and Pearl [25,27]. We consider the problems of recognizing
explanations and of deciding whether an explanation over certain variables exists. We
consider the general as well as the restriction to the binary case.
3.1. Definitions
We now recall the concept of (full) explanation from [25,27]. Intuitively, an explanation
of an observed event φ is a minimal conjunction of primitive events that causes φ even
when there is uncertainty about the actual situation at hand. The agent’s epistemic state is
given by a set of possible contexts u ∈ D(U), which describes all the possible scenarios
for the actual situation.
More formally, let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model, let X ⊆ V and x ∈D(X), let φ
be an event, and let C ⊆ D(U) be a set of contexts. Then, X = x is an explanation of φ
relative to C , if the following conditions hold:
(EX1) φ(u) holds for every context u ∈ C .
(EX2) X = x is a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C such that X(u)= x .
(EX3) X is minimal. That is, for every X′⊂X, some u ∈ C exists such that X′(u)= x|X′
and X′ = x|X′ is not a weak cause of φ under u.
(EX4) X(u)= x for some u ∈ C , and X(u′) = x for some u′ ∈ C .
The following example illustrates the above notion of explanation.
Example 3.1 (Arsonists continued). Consider the set of contexts C = {u1,1, u1,0, u0,1}.
Then, both A1 = 1 and A2 = 1 are explanations of B = 1 relative to C , since (EX1)
B(u1,1) = B(u1,0) = B(u0,1) = 1, (EX2) A1 = 1 (respectively, A2 = 1) is a weak cause
of B = 1 under u1,1 and u1,0 (respectively, u1,1 and u0,1), (EX3) A1 and A2 are obviously
minimal, and (EX4) A1(u1,1) = 1 and A1(u0,1) = 1 (respectively, A2(u1,1) = 1 and
A2(u1,0) = 1). Furthermore, A1 = 1 ∧ A2 = 1 is not an explanation of B = 1 relative
to C , as here, the minimality condition EX3 is violated.
3.2. Results
In our complexity analysis, we focus on the following problems, which are major tasks
in explanation-based causal reasoning:
2 Note that the first argument of g allows to access the original problem instance I1.
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Table 1
Complexity of explanations




Explanation Existence P3 -complete 
P
2 -complete
Explanation: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), an event φ, and a set of contexts
C ⊆D(U), decide whether X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C .
Explanation Existence: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , an event φ, and a set of contexts
C ⊆D(U), decide whether some X′ ⊆X and x ′ ∈D(X′) exist such that X′ = x ′
is an explanation of φ relative to C .
The first problem, Explanation, is the recognition of an explanation. It emerges directly
from the definition of explanation in Section 3.1 and captures its intrinsic complexity. The
second problem, Explanation Existence, is associated with the important task of finding an
explanation for an event φ. Similar as in other frameworks for explanations (e.g., [35,47]),
the set X focuses attention to a subset of the variables, in terms of which the explanation
must be formed. Finding explanations is certainly the central task of a causal-reasoning
system built for applications in practice, and thus this problem deserves special attention.
We analyze the complexity of these problems for the general as well as the binary case,
where M is restricted to binary causal models (i.e., each endogenous variable may take
only two values).
Our complexity results on these two problems for the general and the binary case are
summarized in Table 1. In detail, the problem Explanation is complete for the class DP2
(respectively, DP) in the general (respectively, binary) case, while the problem Explanation
Existence is complete for P3 (respectively, P2 ) in the general (respectively, binary) case.
It thus turns out that finding explanations is at the third level of PH. Hence, explanations
are harder to compute than weak causes, which lie at the second level of PH [14]. On the
other hand, recognizing explanations is only mildly harder than recognizing weak causes,
which is P2 -complete.
We now show how the complexity results in Table 1 can be formally derived. In order
not to distract from the flow of reading, we present the main parts and key ideas behind
constructions, and move some technical details to Appendix A.
The following result shows that deciding explanations is DP2-complete in the general
case. The problem is in DP2, as condition EX2 amounts to a conjunction of a linear number
of problems in P2 , and EX3 to the negation of such a problem; EX1 and EX4 are easily
checked. Thus, by usual techniques, the explanation check can be reduced to a conjunction
of problems inP2 and
P
2 . Hardness for D
P
2 is shown by a reduction from the D
P
2-complete
problem of deciding, given a pair (Φ1,Φ2) of QBFs, whether Φ1 is valid and Φ2 is not
valid.
Theorem 3.2. Explanation is DP2 -complete.
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Proof. As for membership in DP, recall that X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C2
iff EX1–EX4 hold. Deciding in EX1 whether φ(u) for every u ∈ C and in EX4 whether
X(u)= x and X(u′) = x for some u,u′ ∈ C is polynomial. In EX2, the set C ′ of all u ∈ C
such that X(u) = x is polynomially computable. By Theorem 2.6 and as P2 is closed
under polynomially many conjunctions, deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ
under every u ∈ C ′ is inP2 . In EX3, guessing someX′ ⊂X and checking thatX′ = x|X′ is
a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C such that X′(u)= x|X′ is in P2 . Thus, deciding EX3
is in P2 . In summary, deciding whetherX = x is an explanation of φ relative to C is in DP2.
Hardness for DP2 is shown by a reduction from deciding, given a pair (Φ1,Φ2) of QBFs
Φi = ∃Ai∀Bi γi with i ∈ {1,2}, where each γi is a propositional formula on the variables
Ai = {Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,mi } and Bi = {Bi,1, . . . ,Bi,ni }, whether Φ1 is valid and Φ2 is not valid.
We construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), C ⊆D(U), and φ as required such that
X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C iff Φ1 is valid and Φ2 is not valid.
Roughly speaking, the main idea behind this construction is as follows. We construct
M1 = (U,V1,F1) and M2 = (U,V2,F2) and two events φ1 and φ2 such that (i) V1 ∩ V2 =
{G} (that is, G is the only endogenous variable that M1 and M2 have in common), and
(ii) for every u ∈D(U), it holds that G= 0 is a weak cause of φi under u in Mi iff Φi is
valid (see Fig. 3, left side). The causal model M is the union of M1 and M2, enlarged by
the additional endogenous variables G′ and H (see Fig. 3, right side). We then construct
φ and u1, u2 ∈D(U) such that φ is under u1 and u2 equivalent to φ1 and φ2, respectively.
Finally, the construction is such that G = 0 ∧ G′ = 0 is an explanation of φ relative to
C = {u1, u2} in M , iff (a) G = 0 is a weak cause of φ1 under u1 in M1, and (b) G= 0 is
not a weak cause of φ2 under u2 in M2, where (a) (respectively, (b)) is encoded in EX2
(respectively, EX3). That is, G= 0 ∧G′ = 0 is an explanation of φ relative to C in M , iff
Φ1 is valid and Φ2 is not valid.
More formally, for every i ∈ {1,2}, the causal model Mi = (U,Vi,Fi) is defined by
U={E} and Vi=Ai ∪ Bi ∪ {G,Ci}, where D(S) = {0,1,2} for all S ∈ Bi , and D(S) =








∨ (Ci = 0)∨
(






where γ ′i is obtained from γi by replacing each S ∈ Ai ∪Bi by “S = 1”. The functions in
Fi = {F iS | S ∈ Vi} are defined as follows:
Fig. 3. Schematic construction for evaluating two QBFs Φ1 and Φ2.
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• F i = 0 for all S ∈Ai ∪ {G,Ci},S
• F iS =G+Ci for all S ∈Bi .
As shown in [14,18], for every i ∈ {1,2} and u ∈D(U), it holds that G= 0 is a weak cause
of φi under u in Mi iff Φi is valid.
The causal model M = (U,V,F ) is now defined by V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ {G′,H }, where
D(G′)=D(H)= {0,1}, and F = F1 ∪ F2 ∪ {FG′ = E, FH = 1 iff (E = 0 ∧ φ1)∨ (E =
1∧φ2) is true}. Let φ be defined as H = 1, and let u1, u2 ∈D(U) be defined by u1(E)= 0
and u2(E)= 1. Observe that φ is primitive.
For every i ∈ {1,2} and u ∈D(U), it holds that G= 0 is a weak cause of φi under u in
M iff Φi is valid. Hence, for every i ∈ {1,2},
(i) G= 0 is a weak cause of φ under ui in M iff Φi is valid.
By Proposition 2.5, the following statements hold:
(ii) G= 0 is a weak cause of φ under u1 in M iff
G= 0∧G′ = 0 is a weak cause of φ under u1 in M .
(iii) G′ = 0 is not a weak cause of φ under u1 in M .
Using these results, we now show that G= 0∧G′ = 0 is an explanation of φ relative to
C = {u1, u2} iff Φ1 is valid and Φ2 is not valid.
(⇒) Assume that G= 0∧G′ = 0 is an explanation of φ relative to C . In particular, by
EX2, G= 0 ∧G′ = 0 is a weak cause of φ under u1. Moreover, by EX3, G= 0 is either
not a weak cause of φ under u1, or not a weak cause of φ under u2. By (ii), G = 0 is a
weak cause of φ under u1. Thus, G= 0 is not a weak cause of φ under u2. By (i), Φ1 is
valid, and Φ2 is not valid.
(⇐) Assume that Φ1 is valid and Φ2 is not valid. We first show that EX1 holds. As
Ci(u)= 0 for all i ∈ {1,2} and u ∈ C , we get φi(u) for all i ∈ {1,2} and u ∈ C . Thus, φ(u)
for all u ∈ C . To see that EX4 holds, observe that G(u1) =G′(u1)= 0, while G(u2)= 0
and G′(u2)= 1. We next show that EX2 holds. By (i), G= 0 is a weak cause of φ under
u1. By (ii), it follows that G= 0 ∧G′ = 0 is a weak cause of φ under u1. We now show
that EX3 holds. By (i), G= 0 is not a weak cause of φ under u2. By (iii), G′ = 0 is not a
weak cause of φ under u1. ✷
The following theorem shows that deciding whether an explanation over certain vari-
ables exists isP3 -complete. Here, the
P
3 upper bound is straightforward by the
P
2 upper
bound of recognizing explanations, and a standard guess and check argument. The P3 -
hardness of Explanation Existence stems from a subtlety in the definition of explanation.
From satisfaction of EX1, EX2 and EX4 for X = x we can not conclude that some X′ = x ′
contained in X = x exists which will satisfy EX1–EX4; if we minimize X = x so as to
satisfy EX3, the resulting X′ = x ′ may violate EX4. It is this interplay of the conditions
which makes this problem difficult, and the proofs of the hardness results nontrivial.
Theorem 3.3. Explanation Existence is P3 -complete.
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Proof (sketch). As for membership in P3 , observe that the problem can be reduced to
guessing some X′ ⊆ X and x ′ ∈D(X′), and verifying that X′ = x ′ is an explanation of φ
relative to C . By Theorem 3.2, this can be done in polynomial time with two calls to a P2 -
oracle. Thus, the problem is in P3 .
Hardness for P3 is shown by a reduction from deciding whether a given QBF Φ =∃B∀C∃Dγ is valid, where γ is a propositional formula on the variables B ∪ C ∪D. We
construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , C ⊆D(U), and φ such that Φ is valid iff some X′ ⊆X
and x ′ ∈D(X′) exist such that X′ = x ′ is an explanation of φ relative to C . Roughly, the
main idea is to encode the quantifier “∃B” in guessing some X′ ⊆ X, and “∀C ∃Dγ ” in
checking the complement of a weak cause in EX3. Note that the construction is technically
involved; it is schematically shown in Fig. 4. ✷
In the binary case, the complexity of all considered problems drops by one level in PH;
this parallels the drop of the complexity of weak causes from P2 to NP in the binary
case [14]. The membership parts can be derived analogous as in the general case, and
the hardness parts by slight adaptations of the constructions in the proofs, where certain
subcomponents for weak cause testing are modularly replaced. The following two results
show that recognizing explanations (respectively, deciding the existence of explanations)
is complete for DP (respectively, P2 ) in the binary case.
Theorem 3.4. Explanation is DP-complete in the binary case.
Proof. As for membership in DP, recall that X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C
iff EX1–EX4 hold. By the proof of Theorem 3.2, checking EX1 and EX4 is polynomial.
Moreover, in EX2, the set C ′ of all u ∈ C such that X(u)= x is polynomially computable.
By Theorem 2.6, deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C ′ is in
NP in the binary case. In EX3, guessing some X′ ⊂ X and checking that X′ = x|X′ is a
weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C with X′(u)= x|X′ is in NP in the binary case. Thus,
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the complementary problem of deciding EX3 is in co-NP in the binary case. In summary,
deciding whether X= x is an explanation of φ relative to C is in DP in the binary case.
Hardness for DP is shown by a reduction from the following DP-complete problem.
Given two propositional formulas in 3DNF α1 = α1,1 ∨ · · · ∨ α1,k1 and α2 = α2,1 ∨ · · · ∨
α2,k2 on the variables A1 = {A1,1, . . . ,A1,n1} and A2 = {A2,1, . . . ,A2,n2}, respectively,
where k1, k2, n1, n2  1, decide whether α1 is not a tautology and α2 is a tautology.
Without loss of generality, A1 ∩A2 = ∅, and k1, k2  2.
We construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), C ⊆ D(U), and φ such that X = x
is an explanation of φ relative to C iff α1 is not a tautology and α2 is a tautology. The
construction is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Roughly, we replace the part
for P2 -hardness of deciding weak cause in the general case by a new part for NP-hardness
of deciding weak cause in the binary case.
More formally, for every i ∈ {1,2}, we define the causal model Mi = (U,Vi,Fi)
as follows. The exogenous and endogenous variables are given by U = {E} and Vi =
Ai ∪ {G,Di,1, . . . ,Di,ki−1}, respectively, where D(S) = {0,1} for all S ∈ U ∪ Vi . The
functions Fi = {F iS | S ∈ Vi} are defined by:
• F iS = 1 for all S ∈Ai ∪ {G},
• F iDi,1 =G∨ αi,1,
• F iDi,j =Di,j−1 ∨ αi,j for all j ∈ {2, . . . , ki − 1}.
Let φi = Di,k−1 ∨ αi,k . As shown in [14,18], for every i ∈ {1,2} and u ∈D(U), it holds
that G= 1 is a weak cause of φi under u in Mi iff αi is not a tautology.
The causal model M = (U,V,F ) is now defined by V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ {G′,H } and
F = F1 ∪ F2 ∪ {FG′ = E, FH = 1 iff (E = 0 ∧ φ1) ∨ (E = 1 ∧ φ2) is true}. Let φ be
defined as H = 1, and let u1, u2 ∈D(U) be defined by u1(E)= 1 and u2(E)= 0. Observe
that φ is primitive.
By a similar line of argumentation as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, it follows that
G = 1 ∧G′ = 1 is an explanation of φ relative to C = {u1, u2} iff α1 is not a tautology
and α2 is a tautology. ✷
Theorem 3.5. Explanation Existence is P2 -complete in the binary case.
Proof (sketch). As for membership in P2 , by Theorem 3.4, guessing some X′⊆X and
x ′∈D(X′), and verifying that X′ = x ′ is an explanation of φ relative to C can be done in
polynomial time with two NP-oracle calls in the binary case. This shows that Explanation
Existence is in P2 in the binary case.
Hardness for P2 is shown by a reduction from the following 
P
2 -complete problem.
Given a QBF Φ = ∃B ∀C γ , where γ is a propositional formula on the variables
B={B1, . . . ,Bl} and C={C1, . . . ,Cm}, decide whether Φ is valid. We construct M =
(U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , C ⊆D(U), and φ such that Φ is valid iff some X′ ⊆X and x ′ ∈D(X′)
exist such that X′ = x ′ is an explanation of φ relative to C . The construction is similar
to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Roughly, we replace the part for P2 -hardness of
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deciding weak cause in the general case by a new part for NP-hardness of deciding weak
cause in the binary case. ✷
4. Partial explanations and explanatory power
In this section, we analyze the complexity of partial explanations in the structural-model
approach due to Halpern and Pearl [25,27]. We consider the problems of recognizing α-
partial / partial explanations and of deciding whether an α-partial explanation over certain
variables exists. Furthermore, we consider the problem of computing the explanatory
power of a partial explanation. All complexity results are derived for the general as well as
the binary case.
4.1. Definitions
We now recall the notions of α-partial/partial explanations and of explanatory power
of partial explanations [25,27]. Roughly, the main idea behind partial explanations is
to generalize the notion of explanation of Section 3.1 to a setting where additionally a
probability distribution over the set of possible contexts is given.
Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. LetX ⊆ V and x ∈D(X). Let φ be an event, and
let C ⊆D(U) be such that φ(u) for all u ∈ C . We use the expression CφX=x to denote the
unique largest subset C ′ of C such that X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C ′. The fol-
lowing proposition shows that CφX=x is defined, if there exists a subset C ′ of C such thatX =
x is an explanation of φ relative to C ′. It also gives a useful characterization of CφX=x .
Proposition 4.1. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈D(X), and let
φ be an event. Let C ⊆D(U) be such that φ(u) for all u ∈ C . If X = x is an explanation
of φ relative to some C ′ ⊆ C , then CφX=x is the set of all u ∈ C such that either (i) X(u) = x ,
or (ii) X(u)= x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u.
Proof. Clearly, CφX=x does not contain any u ∈ C such that X(u)= x and that X = x is not
a weak cause of φ under u, as otherwise EX2 would be violated. Hence, CφX=x is a subset of
the set of all u ∈ C such that either (i) or (ii). Assume now that some u′ ∈ C with X(u′) = x
does not belong to CφX=x . Then, X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C ′ = CφX=x ∪ {u′}.
But this contradicts CφX=x being the largest such C ′. Assume next that some u′ ∈ C such that
X(u′)= x and that X = x is a weak cause of φ under u′ does not belong to CφX=x . Then,
X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C ′ = CφX=x ∪ {u′}. But this contradicts again CφX=x
being the largest such C ′. Hence, CφX=x is the set of all u ∈ C such that either (i) or (ii). ✷
Let P be a probability function on C , and define
P
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Then, X = x is called an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P) iff Cφ is definedX=x
and P(CφX=x |X = x) α. We say X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P) iff
X = x is an α-partial explanation for some α > 0; furthermore, P(CφX=x |X = x) is called
its explanatory power (or goodness).
Example 4.2 (Arsonists continued). Consider the set of contexts C = {u1,1, u1,0, u0,1},
and let P be the uniform distribution over C . Then, both A1 = 1 and A2 = 1 are 1-partial
explanations of B = 1. That is, both A1 = 1 and A2 = 1 are partial explanations of B = 1
with explanatory power 1.
As for computation, we assume that the above probability functions P are computable
in polynomial time.
4.2. Results
In our analysis, we consider the following important problems related to partial
explanations and their explanatory power:
α-Partial Explanation: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), an event φ, a set of
contexts C ⊆ D(U) such that φ(u) for all u ∈ C , a probability function P on C ,
and α  0, decide whether X = x is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to
(C,P ).
α-Partial Explanation Existence: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , an event φ, a set of
contexts C ⊆ D(U) such that φ(u) for all u ∈ C , a probability function P on C ,
and α  0, decide whether some X′ ⊆X and x ′ ∈D(X′) exist such that X′ = x ′
is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ).
Partial Explanation: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), an event φ, a set of
contexts C ⊆ D(U) such that φ(u) for all u ∈ C , a probability function P on C ,
decide whether X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ).
Explanatory Power: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), an event φ, C ⊆ D(U),
and a probability function P on C , where (i) φ(u) for all u ∈ C , and (ii) X = x
is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ), compute the explanatory power of
X = x .
The problems α-Partial/Partial Explanation and α-Partial Explanation Existence can be
viewed as relaxations of Explanation and Explanation Existence, respectively, in a proba-
bilistic context. Explanatory Power is the problem of computing the “goodness” of a partial
explanation X = x , given by the coverage of the cases where X = x is true in the contexts
C . This information can be used to rank partial explanations and single out “best” ones.
Our complexity results on these problems for the general and the binary case are sum-
marized in Table 2. In detail, recognizing α-partial / partial explanations is complete for
P
P
2‖ (respectively, PNP‖ ) in the general (respectively, binary) case, while deciding the exis-
tence of α-partial explanations is complete for P3 (respectively, P2 ). Furthermore, com-
puting the explanatory power of a partial explanation is complete for FP
P
2‖ (respectively,
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Table 2
Complexity of partial explanations and explanatory power
Problem General case Binary case
α-Partial Explanation P
P2‖ -complete PNP‖ -complete




P2‖ -complete PNP‖ -complete
Explanatory Power FP
P2‖ -complete FPNP‖ -complete
FPNP‖ ) in the general (respectively, binary) case. Hence, finding α-partial explanations has
the same complexity as finding full explanations, while recognizing α-partial/partial ex-
planations is mildly harder than recognizing full explanations.
The following result shows that recognizing α-partial explanations is P
P
2‖ -complete.
Roughly, to recognize an α-partial/partial explanation, we need to know the set of contexts
CφX=x . By exploiting the basic characterization result in Proposition 4.1, it can be computed
efficiently with parallel calls to a P2 oracle. Once CφX=x is known, we need to check
whether X = x is an explanation relative to it, the rest is easy. Thus, the complexity of
these problems lies here in the computation of CφX=x .
Theorem 4.3. α-Partial Explanation is P
P
2‖ -complete.
Proof (sketch). We first prove membership in P
P
2‖ . Recall that X = x is an α-partial
explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff (a) X = x is an explanation of φ relative to CφX=x ,
and (b) P(CφX=x |X = x)  α. By Proposition 4.1, CφX=x is the set of all u ∈ C such that
either (i) X(u) = x , or (ii) X(u)= x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. As deciding
(i) is polynomial, and deciding (ii) is in P2 , by Theorem 2.6, computing CφX=x is in FP
P2‖ .
Once CφX=x is given, deciding (a) is possible with two P2 -oracle calls, by Theorem 3.2,
and deciding (b) is polynomial. It is now well-known that two rounds of parallel P2 -oracle
queries in a polynomial-time computation can be replaced by a single one [3]. Hence, the





2‖ is shown by a reduction from deciding, given k QBFs Φi =∃Ai ∀Bi γi with i∈{1, . . . , k}, where each γi is a propositional formula on the variables
Ai = {Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,mi } and Bi = {Bi,1, . . . ,Bi,ni }, whether the number of valid formulas
among Φ1, . . . ,Φk is even. Without loss of generality, A1 ∪B1, . . . ,Ak ∪Bk are pairwise
disjoint, Φ1 is valid, and for each j∈{2, . . . , k}, the validity of Φj implies the validity
of Φj−1 [51]. We construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), φ, C ⊆ D(U), P, and α
such that X = x is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff the number of valid
formulas among Φ1, . . . ,Φk is even. Roughly, the main idea behind this construction is as
follows. For each Φi , we construct an instance of weak cause, that is, Mi = (Ui,Vi,Fi),
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Xi ⊆ Vi , xi ∈ D(Xi), ui ∈ D(Ui) and an event φi , such that Xi = xi is a weak cause of
φi under ui in Mi iff Φi is valid. Then, M is the union of all Mi , enlarged by additional
variables (see Fig. 5), and we define X = X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xk and x = x1 . . . xk . By setting P
to the uniform distribution over C and α = 1 / |C|, we obtain that X = x is an α-partial
explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff X = x is an explanation of φ relative to CφX=x . The
latter is made to hold iff the number of valid formulas among the Φi ’s is even. In detail,
EX3 is violated iff i is even, Φi is not valid, and Φi−1 is valid. ✷
The following theorem shows that deciding the existence of α-partial explanations
is complete for P3 . Here, the 
P
3 upper bound follows from the P
P2‖ upper bound of
recognizing α-partial explanations by a standard guess and check argument. The P3 -
hardness is inherited from the P3 -hardness of Explanation Existence.
Theorem 4.4. α-Partial Explanation Existence is P3 -complete.
Proof. We first prove membership in P3 . By Theorem 4.3, deciding whether X
′=x ′ is
an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) is in P
P
2‖ . Hence, guessing some X′ ⊆ X
and x ′ ∈D(X′), and deciding whether X′ = x ′ is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to
(C,P ) is in P3 .
Hardness for P3 is shown by a reduction from Explanation Existence (see Theo-
rem 3.3). Given an instance of it, let P be the uniform distribution on C , and let α = 1.
Then, X′ = x ′ is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff X′ = x ′ is an explana-
tion of φ relative to C . ✷
The next theorem shows that deciding partial explanations is P
P
2‖ -complete. The
membership part is proved similarly as in the proof of Theorem 4.3. The hardness part
follows easily from the hardness result in Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.5. Partial Explanation is P
P
2‖ -complete.
Proof. As for membership in P
P
2‖ , recall that X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative
to (C,P ) iff (a) X = x is an explanation of φ relative to CφX=x , and (b) CφX=x contains some
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u such that X(u)= x and P(u) > 0. By the proof of Theorem 4.3, computing Cφ is inX=x
FP
P
2‖ . Once CφX=x is given, checking (a) is in DP2 by Theorem 3.2, and checking (b) is
polynomial. As two rounds of parallel P2 -oracle queries in a polynomial-time computa-
tion can be replaced by a single one [3], deciding whether X = x is a partial explanation
of φ relative to (C,P ) is in P
P
2‖ .
We next show P
P
2‖ -hardness. If P is the uniform distribution over C , then X = x is
a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff X = x is a 1/|C|-partial explanation of φ
relative to (C,P ). By the proof of Theorem 4.3, deciding the latter is complete for P
P
2‖ .
Thus, deciding whether X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) is PP2‖ -hard,
and hardness holds even if P is the uniform distribution over C . ✷
The following result shows that computing the explanatory power of a partial
explanation is FP
P
2‖ -complete. Here, the membership part is proved similarly as in the
proof of Theorem 4.3. The hardness part is shown by a reduction from computing all valid
QBFs among k given QBFs Φ = ∃A∀Bγ .
Theorem 4.6. Explanatory Power is FP
P
2‖ -complete.
Proof (sketch). We first prove membership in FP
P
2‖ . Let X = x be a partial explanation
of φ relative to (C,P). To compute its explanatory power, we compute first CφX=x and then
P(CφX=x |X = x). By the proof of Theorem 4.3, the former is in FP
P2‖ , while the latter is





2‖ is shown by a reduction from computing, given k QBFs Φi =∃Ai∀Biγi with i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, where each γi is a propositional formula on the vari-
ables Ai = {Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,mi } and Bi = {Bi,1, . . . ,Bi,ni }, the vector (v1, . . . , vk) ∈ {0,1}k
such that vi = 1 iff Φi is valid, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Without loss of generality, A1 ∪
B1, . . . ,Ak ∪Bk are pairwise disjoint, and Φ1 is valid. Roughly speaking, the main idea is
to construct a problem instance such that (v1, . . . , vk) is the bit-vector representation of the
explanatory power of X = x . The construction is similar to the one in the proof of Theo-
rem 4.3, which is illustrated in Fig. 5. For each Φi , we construct Mi = (Ui, Vi,Fi), Xi ⊆
Vi , xi∈D(Xi), ui∈D(Ui), and an event φi such that Xi = xi is a weak cause of φi under ui
in Mi iff Φi is valid. These models are then combined in M such that ui ∈ CφX=x iff Φi is
valid. Defining P(ui)= 2i−1 / (2k − 1) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} completes the reduction. ✷
5. Succinct representation
Our complexity results in Sections 3 and 4 (as summarized in Tables 1 and 2) assume
that the set of contexts C is enumerated in the input. However, C may contain exponentially
many contexts. Hence, a descriptive representation can be much more compact and
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Table 3
Complexity of explanations and partial explanations: succinct representation
Problem General case Binary case
Explanation P4 -complete 
P
3 -complete
Partial Explanation P4 -complete 
P
3 -complete
desirable in practice. In the succinct representation setting, we thus assume that C is given
by a tractable membership function χC(u). That is, on input of u ∈D(U), function χC(u)
reports in polynomial time whether u ∈ C holds. This includes, e.g., descriptions of C in
terms of propositional formulas β over U such that the models of β describe the contexts
in C .
Table 3 shows our complexity results for some of the problems in Sections 3 and 4
in the setting where contexts are succinctly represented. More precisely, recognizing
explanations and partial explanations in the case of succinct context sets is complete for
P4 (respectively, P3 ) in the general (respectively, binary) case.
Thus, it turns out that succinct representation increases the complexity of Explanation
and Partial Explanation drastically. Intuitively, in this case checking a property for all
contexts in C becomes much harder, since there seems no better way than guessing
the “right” context witnessing or disproving the property. The complexity increase by
two levels in PH stems from the fact that condition EX3 involves two nested checks of
properties for all contexts in C . This dominates the complexity of EX1, EX2, and EX4 and
leads to P4 complexity.
For α-Partial Explanation, we have similar effects. Worse, we need to calculate sums of
probabilities over succinctly represented context sets. This leads us outside PH: It requires
us to solve problems which are at least as hard as deciding whether a given propositional
CNF β has  k models, where k is in the input. This problem is, as generally believed,
not in PH. We refrain from a detailed analysis of computing α-partial explanations here.
A complexity increase for Explanation Existence under succinct context sets to P5 is
plausible, though we have not analyzed it; note that already the P4 -hardness proof for
Explanation is rather involved.
The following result shows that deciding explanation is P4 -complete for succinct
context sets. Here, membership in P4 follows from the fact that checking EX1, EX2, EX3,
and EX4 is in co-NP, P3 , 
P
4 , and NP, respectively, for succinct context sets. Hardness
for P4 is shown by a reduction from deciding whether a given QBF Φ = ∀A∃B∀C∃Dγ
is valid, which is essentially encoded in condition EX3.
Theorem 5.1. Explanation is P4 -complete for succinct context sets.
Proof (sketch). Recall that X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C iff EX1–EX4
hold. Under succinct context sets, in EX1, deciding φ(u) for all u ∈ C is in co-NP. In
EX4, deciding whether X(u) = x and X(u′) = x hold for some u,u′ ∈ C is in NP. By
Theorem 2.6, deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C with
X(u) = x in EX2 is in P3 . Thus, deciding whether some X′ ⊂ X exists such that
X′ = x|X′ is a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C with X′(u) = x|X′ is in P4 . That
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Hardness for P4 is shown by a reduction from deciding whether a given QBF Φ =∀A∃B∀C∃Dγ is valid, where γ is a propositional formula on the variablesA∪B∪C ∪D.
We construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), φ, and C ⊆D(U) such that X = x is an
explanation of φ relative to C iff Φ is valid. This construction is schematically illustrated
in Fig. 6. Roughly, the main idea is to encode Φ in EX3, where the quantifier “∀A” is
represented by considering all X′ ⊂ X, the quantifier “∃B” is expressed by finding some
u ∈D(U), and ∀C ∃Dγ is expressed by checking the complement of a weak cause. ✷
The next result shows that under succinct context sets, also deciding partial explanation
is P4 -complete. Here, membership in 
P
4 can be proved similarly as in the proof of
Theorem 5.1, using additionally Proposition 4.1. Hardness for P4 easily follows from an
extension of the hardness part in the proof of Theorem 5.1, where we additionally assume
the uniform distribution P on the set of contexts.
Theorem 5.2. Partial Explanation is P4 -complete for succinct context sets.
Proof. As for membership in P4 , recall that X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative
to (C,P ) iff (a) X = x is an explanation of φ relative to CφX=x , and (b) CφX=x contains some
u such that X(u)= x and P(u) > 0. By Proposition 4.1, CφX=x is the set of all u ∈ C such
that either (i) X(u) = x , or (ii) X(u) = x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. To
check that (a) holds, we check that EX1–EX4 hold. Clearly, EX1 and EX2 always hold.
The complement of EX3 says that some X′ ⊂ X exists such that for every u ∈ C it holds
that X′(u)= x|X′ and u ∈ CφX=x implies that X′ = x|X′ is a weak cause of φ under u. That
is, some X′ ⊂ X exists such that for every u ∈ C , it holds either (a) X′(u) = x|X′, or (b)
X(u)= x and X = x is not a weak cause of φ under u, or (c) X′ = x|X′ is a weak cause of
φ under u. As deciding whetherX = x (respectively,X′ = x|X′) is a weak cause of φ under
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u is in P , deciding whether EX3 does not hold is in P . That is, deciding whether EX32 4
holds is in P4 . EX4 says that some u,u
′ ∈ CφX=x exist such that X(u) = x and X(u′)= x .
Equivalently, some u,u′ ∈ C exist such that X(u) = x , and X(u′)= x and X = x is a weak
cause of φ under u′. Thus, deciding whether EX4 holds is in P2 . In summary, checking
(a) is in P4 . Finally, (b) says that some u ∈ C exists such that X(u) = x , P(u) > 0, and
X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. Thus, checking (b) is in P2 . In summary, deciding
whether (a) and (b) hold is in P4 .
Hardness for P4 is shown by a reduction from the 
P
4 -complete problem of deciding
whether a QBF Φ = ∀A∃B ∀C ∃Dγ is valid, where γ is a propositional formula on the
variables A∪B ∪C ∪D.
Let M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), φ, and C ⊆D(U) be defined as in the proof of
Theorem 5.1, and let P be the uniform distribution over C . By the proof of Theorem 5.1,
(∗) X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C iff Φ is valid. Furthermore, φ is primitive,
φ(u) for all u ∈ C , and for every u ∈ C , either (i) X(u) = x , or (ii) X(u)= x and X = x is
a weak cause of φ under u.
By Proposition 4.1, X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff (a) X = x
is an explanation of φ relative to C , and (b) C contains some u such that X(u) = x
and P(u) > 0. Here, (a) implies (b). By (∗), it follows that X = x is a partial explanation
of φ relative to (C,P ) iff Φ is valid. ✷
6. Generalization: situations
In this section, we analyze the complexity of recognizing explanations and of deciding
the existence of explanations in the general case of situations [25,27]. In the course of this,
we also analyze the complexity of checking subsumption and equivalence between causal
models.
6.1. Definitions
We now recall the concept of explanation for the case of situations [25,27]. Intuitively,
an agent may also be uncertain about the causal model, and not only about the context that
applies to the actual situation at hand. Thus, in the general case of situations, the agent’s
epistemic state consists of a set of pairs (M,u), called situations, where M is a causal
model and u is a context. Before defining explanations for situations, we first define causal
formulas and their truth and validity.
A basic causal formula is an expression of the form [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]φ, where
φ is an event, Y1, . . . , Yk are pairwise distinct endogenous variables, yi ∈ D(Yi) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and k  0. The set of causal formulas is the closure of the set of basic causal
formulas under the Boolean operations ¬ and ∧. For Y = {Y1, . . . , Yk} and y = y1 . . . yk ,
we use [Y ← y]φ to abbreviate [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]φ. As usual, we use φ ∨ ψ and
$ to abbreviate ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) and φ ∨ ¬φ, respectively. The truth of a causal formula ψ
in M = (U,V,F ) under u ∈D(U), denoted (M,u) |=ψ , is inductively defined by:
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• (M,u) |= [Y ← y]φ iff φy(u) in M ,
• (M,u) |= ¬φ iff (M,u) |= φ does not hold,
• (M,u) |= φ ∧ψ iff (M,u) |= φ and (M,u) |=ψ .
We say ψ is valid in M = (U,V,F ), denoted M |=ψ , if (M,u) |=ψ for all u∈D(U). By
Th(M) we denote the set of all causal formulas which are valid in M .
The following result, whose easy proof is omitted, shows that deciding validity is co-
NP-complete. Roughly, this result is immediate by the fact that checking M |=ψ amounts
to checking (M,u) |=ψ for each of the in general exponentially many contexts u in D(U).
Proposition 6.1. Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ) and a causal formula ψ , deciding
whether M |=ψ is co-NP-complete.
We are now ready to define situations, and explanations relative to situations as follows.
A situation S = (M,u) consists of a causal modelM = (U,V,F ) and a context u ∈D(U).
Informally, rather than having explanations of the formX = x relative to a set of contexts C ,
whereX is a set of endogenous variables and x ∈D(X), we now generalize to explanations
of the form (ψ,X = x) relative to a set of situations S , where ψ is a causal formula that
restricts the causal models to be considered from S .
Before we give a formal definition, we introduce some useful notation. Let for any set of
situations S and causal formulas ψ and ψ ′ denote ψ |=S ψ ′ that M |=ψ implies M |=ψ ′,
for all (M,u) ∈ S , and let ψ ≡S ψ ′ denote ψ |=S ψ ′ ∧ ψ ′ |=S ψ , i.e., equivalence of ψ
and ψ ′ on the causal models occurring in S .
Let then ψ be a causal formula, let X be a set of endogenous variables, and let
x ∈D(X). Furthermore, let φ be an event, and let S be a set of situations. Then, (ψ,X = x)
is an explanation of φ relative to S , if the following conditions hold:
(ES1) (M,u) |= φ for every situation (M,u) ∈ S .
(ES2) X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M , for every (M,u) ∈ S such that
(M,u) |=X = x and M |=ψ .
(ES3) (ψ,X = x) is minimal. That is, there is no (ψ ′,X′ = x ′) ≈S (ψ,X = x) satisfying
ES2 such that (i) ψ |=S ψ ′ and (ii) X′ ⊆X and x ′ = x|X′.
(ES4) (M,u) |= X = x for some (M,u) ∈ S , and (M ′, u′) |= ¬(X = x) for some
(M ′, u′) ∈ S .
In ES3, (ψ ′,X′ = x ′) ≈S (ψ,X = x) means that either ψ ≡S ψ ′, i.e., ψ ′ and ψ are not
equivalent on the causal models in S , or that X′ = x ′ and X = x are different.
Observe that the notion of explanation for sets of contexts is a special case of the notion
of explanation for sets of situations, as X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C in M iff
($,X = x) is an explanation of φ relative to {(M,u) | u ∈ C}.
The following example illustrates explanations relative to situations.
Example 6.2 (Arsonists continued). Consider the causal model M = (U,V,F ) of the
running example given in Example 2.1. Let the causal model M ′ = (U,V,F ′) be identical
to M except that the function F ′B ∈ F ′ is now defined by F ′B = 1 iff A1 = 1 and A2 = 1.
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Informally, this says that the whole forest burns down iff both arsonists start a fire. Let the
causal model M ′′ = (U ′′,V ,F ′′) be identical to M except that now the set of exogenous
variables is given by U ′′ = {U1,U2,U3} and the function F ′′B ∈ F ′′ is defined by F ′′B = 1
iff A1 = 1 or A2 = 1 or U3 = 1. Intuitively, the whole forest burns down iff either some
arsonist starts a fire or some other event results into a fire (which is expressed by the
exogenous variable U3). Let the causal formula ψ be given by [A1 ← 0, A2 ← 0]B = 0
(intuitively, the whole forest burns down only if one of the two arsonists starts a fire), and
let the context u1,1,1 ∈D(U ′′) be defined by u1,1,1(Ui)= 1 for all i ∈ {1,2,3} (intuitively,
both arsonists intend to start a fire, and there is also some other event that results into a
fire).
Then, both (ψ,A1 = 1) and (ψ,A2 = 1) are explanations of B = 1 relative to
the set of situations S = {(M,u1,1), (M,u0,1), (M,u1,0), (M ′, u1,1), (M ′′, u1,1,1)}, since
(ES1) S |= B = 1 for all S ∈ S , (ES2) A1 = 1 (respectively, A2 = 1) is a weak cause of
B = 1 relative to every S ∈ {(M,u1,1), (M,u1,0), (M ′, u1,1)} (respectively, S ∈ {(M,u1,1),
(M,u0,1), (M ′, u1,1)}), (ES3) A1 = 1 (respectively, A2 = 1) is trivially minimal, and ψ
also cannot be weakened to some ψ ′ such that M ′′ |= ψ ′, since A1 = 1 (respectively,
A2 = 1) is not a weak cause of B = 1 relative to (M ′′, u1,1,1), and (ES4) A1(u1,1) = 1
and A1(u0,1) = 1 (respectively, A2(u1,1)= 1 and A2(u1,0) = 1) in M .
We next define the concepts of subsumption and equivalence between causal mod-
els. We say that a causal model M = (U,V,F ) subsumes a collection of causal mod-
els M1,M2, . . . ,Mn, where Mi = (Ui,Vi,Fi) with V = Vi , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, denoted
M1,M2, . . . ,Mn M , iff for all causal formulas φ on the variables in V , it holds that
Mi |= φ, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, implies M |= φ, that is,⋂ni=1 Th(Mi)⊆ Th(M). Two causal
models M1 = (U1,V1,F1) and M2 = (U2,V2,F2), where V1 = V2, are equivalent, de-
noted M1 ≡ M2, iff M1  M2 and M2  M1. That is, M1 and M2 are equivalent iff
Th(M1)= Th(M2). In other words, M1 and M2 are indiscernible in the language of causal
formulas.
The following result provides a characterization of the failure of subsumption of a
collection of causal models by some causal model. This characterization is particularly
useful for assessing the computational complexity of deciding this relationship as well as
of deciding equivalence of causal models.
Theorem 6.3. Let M = (U,V,F ) and Mi = (Ui,V ,Fi), 1  i  n, be causal models.
Then, M1,M2, . . . ,Mn M iff the following property holds:
(∗) There exists some u ∈D(U) such that for every i∈{1, . . . , n} and for every ui∈D(Ui),
there exists some causal formula [Y ← y]X= x , where Y is a (possibly empty) set of
endogenous variables and X is a single variable, such that (i) (M,u) |= [Y ← y]X=
x and (ii) (Mi,ui) |= [Y ← y]X= x .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose M1,M2, . . . ,MnM , that is, T = ⋂ni=1 Th(Mi) ⊆ Th(M). Let
φ ∈ T \Th(M) be an arbitrary formula. As φ /∈ Th(M), there exists some context u ∈D(U)
such that (M,u) |= φ, while (Mi,ui) |= φ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ui ∈D(Ui). As easily
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seen, for all recursive causal models M ′ = (U ′,V ′,F ′) and u′ ∈ D(U ′), the following
holds (cf. also [24]):
• (M ′, u′) |= [Y ← y]¬ψ iff (M ′, u′) |= ¬[Y ← y]ψ ;
• (M ′, u′) |= [Y ← y] (ψ1 ∧ψ2) iff (M ′, u′) |= [Y ← y]ψ1 ∧ [Y ← y]ψ2.
Therefore, φ is equivalent to a Boolean combination of causal formulas of the form [Y ′ ←
y ′]X′ = x ′, where Y ′ is a (possibly empty) set of endogenous variables and X′ is a single
variable. Moreover, as the domain of every variable is finite, we can equivalently rewrite φ




[Yj,k ← yj,k]Xj,k = xj,k
)
,
where each Xj,k is a single variable. Since (Mi,ui) |= φ, it follows that (Mi,ui) |=
[Yj,k ← yj,k]Xj,k = xj,k for some j = j0 and all k ∈ Kj0 ; on the other hand, since
(M,u) |= φ, some k0∈Kj0 exists such that (M,u) |= [Yj0,k0 ← yj0,k0]Xj0,k0 = xj0,k0 . As
(Mi,ui) |= [Yj0,k0 ← yj0,k0]Xj0,k0 = xj0,k0 , this proves property (∗).
(⇐) Suppose that (∗) holds. Let φ be the disjunction of all formulas [Y ← y]X = x
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ui as in (∗). Then, (Mi,ui) |= φ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
ui ∈D(Ui), while (M,u) |= φ by construction. This shows that ⋂ni=1 Th(Mi) ⊆ Th(M),
that is, M1,M2, . . . ,MnM . ✷
We remark that a similar result would hold for causal models with arbitrary (finite
and/or infinite variable domains), if also causal formulas [Y ← y]X = x , where X = x
is a primitive event, are allowed in Theorem 6.3.
6.2. Results
Our complexity results for the case of situations are summarized in Table 4. We consider
the problem of recognizing explanations, which turns out to be complete for P3 in
the general and the binary case. Furthermore, we consider the problem of deciding the
existence of explanations, which is shown to be complete for P3 in the general and the
binary case. We also consider the problems of deciding subsumption and equivalence
between causal models, which are shown to be complete for P3 in the general and the
binary case.
Notice that by a standard guess and check argument, P3 membership of Explanation
for situations implies a P4 upper bound for deciding the existence of an explanation for
Table 4
Complexity of explanations: situations
Problem General case Binary case
Explanation P3 -complete 
P
3 -complete
Explanation Existence P3 -complete 
P
3 -complete
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situations, in a sensible formulation of the problem (see below). Moreover, as explanations
for contexts are a special case of explanations for situations, the P3 lower bound of
Explanation Existence in the case of contexts immediately implies a P3 lower bound of
Explanation Existence in the case of situations.
As we show, this lower bound is in fact complemented with a P3 upper bound, which
means that deciding the existence of explanations for situations is not harder than for
contexts. On the other hand, the problem is already P3 -hard for binary models. This is
explained by subsumption checks which implicitly occur in forming an explanation for
situations, whose complexity dominates the complexity of explanations in the binary case.
We exploit the characterization of subsumption in Theorem 6.3 to derive the following
complexity result on checking subsumption between causal models.
Theorem 6.4. Given causal models M = (U,V,F ) and Mi = (Ui,V ,Fi), 1  i  k,
deciding whether M1,M2, . . . ,Mk M is P3 -complete. Hardness holds even if k = 1,
that is, for pairs of causal models.
Proof. We first prove membership inP3 . By Theorem 6.3, to show thatM1, . . . ,Mk M ,
we can guess some u ∈D(U) and then check that for every i∈{1, . . . , k} and ui ∈D(Ui),
there exists some causal formula [Y ← y]X = x , where Y is a (possibly empty) set of
endogenous variables and X is a single variable, such that (i) (M,u) |= [Y ← y]X = x
and (ii) (Mi,ui) |= [Y ← y]X= x . This can be done in nondeterministic polynomial time,
using a P2 -oracle. Thus, the problem is in 
P
3 .
Hardness for P3 for k = 1 is shown by a reduction from deciding whether a given
QBF Φ = ∀B ∃C ∀Dγ is valid, where γ = γ (B,C,D) is a propositional formula on the
variables B = {B1, . . . ,Bl}, C = {C1, . . . ,Cm}, and D = {D1, . . . ,Dn}.
We now construct two causal models M = (U,V,F ) and M1 = (U1,V ,F1) such
that M1 M iff Φ is valid. The sets of exogenous and endogenous variables are defined
by U = U1 = B ∪ C and V =D ∪W ∪ {Z}, respectively, where W = {W1, . . . ,Wl} and
D(X) = {0,1} for all X ∈ U ∪ V . The functions F = {FX | X ∈ V } and F1 = {F 1X |
X ∈ V } are defined by FX = F 1X = 0 for all X ∈ V \ {Z}, FZ =
∨l
i=1(Bi = Wi), and
F 1Z =
∨l
i=1(Bi =Wi)∨¬γ (see Fig. 7).
Fig. 7. Causal models (a) M = (U,V,F ) and (b) M1 = (U1,V ,F1).
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We now prove that Φ is valid iff M1  M2. It can be shown that Φ is not valid iff
(∗) some u ∈D(U) exists such that for every u1 ∈ D(U1), there exists a causal formula
[Y ← y]X= x , where Y ⊆ V and X ∈ V , such that (i) (M,u) |= [Y ← y] X = x and (ii)
(M1, u1) |= [Y ← y]X= x (see Appendix D). By Theorem 6.3, this proves that Φ is valid
iff M1 M2. ✷
By an extension to the proof of Theorem 6.4, we obtain the following complexity result
on testing equivalence between causal models.
Theorem 6.5. Given two causal modelsM1 = (U1,V ,F1) andM2 = (U2,V ,F2), deciding
whether M1 ≡M2 is P3 -complete.
Proof. We first show membership in P3 . Recall that M1 ≡M2 iff M1 M2 and M2 
M1. By Theorem 6.4, deciding whetherM1 M2 (respectively,M2 M1) holds is in P3 .
Thus, as P3 is closed under conjunction, the problem is in P3 .
For the P3 -hardness part, we give a reduction from deciding M1  M2. Roughly
speaking, we construct a causal model M such that Th(M) = Th(M1) ∩ Th(M2). Then,
M1 M2 iff M ≡M1, which proves the result.
We construct the causal model M = (U,V,F ) as follows. Assume, without loss of
generality, that M1 and M2 are such that the union G(M1)∪G(M2)= (V ∪U1 ∪U2,E1∪
E2) of their causal graphsG(M1)= (V ∪U1,E1) and G(M2)= (V ∪U2,E2) is a directed
acyclic graph; note that M and M1 in the proof of Theorem 6.4 have this property.
The set of exogenous variables is given by U = U1 ∪ U2 ∪ {U0}, where U0 is a fresh
exogenous variable with domain D(U0) = {1,2}. The functions F = {FX | X ∈ V } are
constructed from the functions F1 = {F 1X |X ∈ V } and F2 = {F 2X |X ∈ V } as follows. For
each X ∈ V , let the parents PAX of X in M be the union PA1X and PA2X of the parents of
X in M1 and M2, respectively, plus U0, and define FX(x)= F 1X(x|PA1X) if x|U0 = 1, and
FX(x)= F 2X(x|PA2X) if x|U0 = 2. That is, if the U0-component of x is i ∈ {1,2}, then the
value of FX is the value of the function F iX for X in the model Mi on x projected to the
parents of X.
Notice that M is a recursive causal model, because its causal graph G(M) = (U ∪
V,E1 ∪ E2 ∪ {U0 → X | X ∈ V }) is a directed acyclic graph. Clearly, for every causal
formula on V , it holds that M |= φ iff M1 |= φ and M2 |= φ. Thus, Th(M) = Th(M1) ∩
Th(M2), as desired. As M can be built in polynomial time from M1 and M2, the result
follows. ✷
We finally address the issue of recognizing explanations relative to a set of situations S .
In that, we make use of the following lemma, which is helpful in checking the minimality
condition ES3.
Lemma 6.6. LetM andM′ = {M1, . . . ,Mn} be sets of causal models such thatM′ ⊆M.
Then, there exists a causal formula φ definingM′ inM, that is,M′ = {M ∈M |M |= φ},
iff M1, . . . ,MnM holds for every M ∈M \M′.
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Proof. (⇒) Let φ define M′, and assume towards a contradiction that there exists
some M ∈M \M′ such that M1, . . . ,Mn M . Since φ ∈⋂ni=1 Th(Mi), it follows that
φ ∈ Th(M), which contradicts that φ definesM′.
(⇐) Suppose that M1, . . . ,Mn M holds for every model M ∈M \M′. Hence, there
exists a formula φM ∈⋂ni=1 Th(Mi) such that φM /∈ Th(M). Consequently, the formula
φ = ∧M∈M\M′ φM defines M′, that is, for every M ∈M, it holds that M ∈M′ iff
M |= φ. ✷
We are now ready to analyze the complexity of recognizing explanations in the case
of situations. The following theorem shows that this problem is P3 -complete. Here,
P3 -hardness is inherited from the 
P
3 -hardness of subsumption checking. Notice that
for binary causal models, the complexity of recognizing explanations is the same, as
subsumption checking is P3 -hard already for binary causal models.
Theorem 6.7. Given a causal formula ψ , a set of endogenous variables X, a value
x ∈ D(X), an event φ, and a set of situations S , deciding whether (ψ,X = x) is an
explanation of φ relative to S is P3 -complete.
Proof. We first prove membership in P3 . Recall that (ψ,X = x) is an explanation of φ
relative to S iff ES1–ES4 hold. Let M denote the set of all causal models M such that
(M,u) ∈ S for some context u.
By Proposition 2.3, in ES1, deciding whether (M,u) |= φ for all (M,u) ∈ S is
polynomial, and in ES4, deciding whether (M,u) |= X = x and (M ′, u′) |= ¬(X = x)
for some (M,u), (M ′, u′) ∈ S is polynomial.
In ES2, we decide whether for every (M,u) ∈ S , it holds (a) (M,u) |= ¬(X = x), or
(b) (M,u′) |= ¬ψ for some context u′ in M , or (c) X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in
M . By Proposition 2.3, (a) is polynomial and (b) is in NP. By Theorem 2.6, (c) is in P2 .
In summary, deciding whether ES2 holds is in P2 .
In ES3, we apply Lemma 6.6: To disprove ES3, we may guess some X′ ⊆X and some
M′ = {M1, . . . ,Mn} ⊆M such that the following holds: (i) {M ∈M |M |=ψ} ⊆M′, (ii)
M1, . . . ,Mn M for all M ∈M \M′, (iii) X′ =X or {M ∈M |M |=ψ} =M′, and (iv)
for all (M,u) ∈ S , either (a) (M,u) |= ¬(X′ = x|X′), or (b) M /∈M′, or (c) X′ = x|X′ is
a weak cause of φ under u in M . Tasks (i), (iii), and (iv) are clearly solvable in polynomial
time with a P2 oracle. As for (ii), by Theorem 6.4, checking whether M1, . . . ,Mn M
holds for each M ∈M \M′ can be done in nondeterministic polynomial time with a
P2 -oracle. This implies that deciding whether ES3 holds is in 
P
3 . In summary, deciding
whether ES1–ES4 hold is in P3 .
Hardness for P3 is shown by a reduction from the problem of deciding subsumption
between causal models, which is P3 -complete by Theorem 6.4: Given two causal models
M1 = (U1,V ,F1) and M2 = (U2,V ,F2), decide whether M1  M2. By the proof of
Theorem 6.4, we can assume that U1 =U2 =U .
We now construct a causal formula ψ , a set of endogenous variables X, a value
x ∈ D(X), an event φ, and a set of situations S , such that (ψ,X = x) is an explanation
of φ relative to S iff M1 M2.
174 T Eiter, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 154 (2004) 145–198
The set of situations is defined by S = {Si = (Mi,ui) | 3  i  6}, where the causal
models Mi = (Ui,Vi,Fi) and the contexts ui are given as follows. For i ∈ {3, . . . ,6},
the sets of exogenous and endogenous variables are defined by Ui = U ∪ {U0} and
Vi = V ∪ {X0, Y,T }, respectively, where D(X) = {0,1} for all X ∈ {U0,X0, Y,T }. For
i ∈ {3, . . . ,6}, the functions Fi = {F iX |X ∈ Vi} are defined as follows:
• F3 = {F 3X0 = 0, F 3Y = (U0 = 0)∧ (X0 = 1), F 3T = 1} ∪ F1;
• F4 = {F 4X0 = 0, F 4Y = (U0 = 0)∧ (X0 = 1), F 4T = 1} ∪ F2;
• F5 = {F 5X0 = 0, F 5Y =X0, F 5T = 0} ∪ {F 5X = 0 |X ∈ V };
• F6 = {F 6X0 = 1, F 6Y = 0, F 6T = 0} ∪ {F 6X = 0 |X ∈ V }.
The contexts u3, . . . , u6 are arbitrary such that u3(U0)= 0 and u4(U0)= 1.
Observe now that X0 = 0 is a weak cause of Y = 0 under u3 in M3, while X0 = 0 is
not a weak cause of Y = 0 under u4 in M4 (but X0(u4)= 0 in M4). Moreover, notice that
X0 = 0 is a weak cause of Y = 0 under u5 in M5, while X0 = 0 is not a weak cause of
Y = 0 under u6 in M6 (as X0(u6) = 0 in M6).
Intuitively, if we want to form an explanation (ψ,X0 = 0) for Y = 0, the situation
(M6, u6) serves, together with the situation (M5, u5), as a witness to the property ES4. By
minimality of an explanation, we must have M5 selected by ψ , since X0 = 0 is in M5 a
weak cause for Y = 0 in context u5. Furthermore, M3 may be selected; this, however, is
only possible if it does not require to select also M4 by subsumption, as (M4, u4) spoils the
condition ES2. That is, M3 may not be selected, just if M3 M4 holds, which is equivalent
to M1 M2. Thus, if we have a causal formulaψ which selects preciselyM5 andM6, then
the candidate (ψ,X0 = 0) is an explanation just if M1 M2 holds.
We now show that (T = 0,X0 = 0) is an explanation of Y = 0 relative to S iff
M1  M2 holds. Indeed, it is easily checked that by construction, ES1, ES2, and ES4
hold. If M1M2, then ES3 is violated, as (T = 0 ∨ φ,X0 = 0) satisfies ES2, where
φ ∈ Th(M1) \ Th(M2) is arbitrary, and {M ∈M |M |= T = 0 ∨ φ} = {M3, M5,M6} ⊃
{M5,M6} = {M ∈M |M |= T = 0}, where M = {Mi | 3  i  6}. Conversely, if ES3
is violated, then (ψ ′,X′ = x ′) ≈S (T = 0,X0 = 0) means that X′ = x ′ coincides with
X0 = 0 and thus M3 |= ψ ′ and M4 |= ψ ′ must hold (as X0 = 0 is not a weak cause of
Y = 0 under u4 in M4, but X0(u4)= 0 in M4). Thus, M1 M2 holds.
As the above reduction is polynomial, this shows P3 -hardness. ✷
Let us now turn to the issue of deciding the existence of explanations in the general
case of situations. This problem has to be carefully defined, since otherwise simple (and
perhaps unintended) explanations may be found.
It is not difficult to see that if an event φ satisfies ES1 for a set of situations S , and if
X0 is variable and x0 a value for X0 such that ES4 holds for X0 = x0, that then some
explanation of form (ψ,X0 = x0) for φ w.r.t. S exists. This implies that given a set
of variables X to build explanations using them for φ w.r.t. S , deciding whether some
explanation exists is possible in polynomial time.
A more sensible formulation of Explanation Existence for the case of situations is the
following.
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Explanation Existence ( for situations): Given a finite set of situations S , a set of endoge-
nous variables X, a causal formula ψ , and an event φ, decide whether a causal
formula ψ ′ with ψ |=S ψ ′, X′ ⊆X, and x ′ ∈D(X′) exist such that (ψ ′,X′ = x ′)
is an explanation of φ relative to S .
Here, the causal formula ψ is a positive selection condition for causal models in ES2,
such that each causal model M satisfying ψ must be respected and the event X = x must
be a weak cause of φ under u for every situation (M,u) ∈ S such that (M,u) |=X = x and
M |= ψ . A weakening of ψ , that is, a cautious enlargement of the set of respected causal
models is admissible, which amounts to adding alternative selection conditions. Before
we analyze the complexity of Explanation Existence for situations, we introduce some
terminology.
We call a pair (ψ,X = x) a pseudo-explanation of an event φ relative to a set of
situations S , if (ψ,X = x) satisfies conditions ES1, ES2, ES4, and the following weakened
form of ES3:
(ES3′) There is no (ψ,X′ = x ′) ≈S (ψ,X = x) satisfying ES2 such that X′ ⊆ X and
x ′ = x|X′.
The following result is useful for determining the complexity of Explanation Existence.
Lemma 6.8. Given a causal formula ψ , an event φ, a set of endogenous variables X, and
a finite set of situations S , there exists an explanation (ψ ′,X′ = x ′) of φ relative to S such
that ψ |=S ψ ′, X′ ⊆X, and x ′ ∈D(X′) iff there exists a pseudo-explanation (ψ ′,X′ = x ′)
of φ relative to S such that ψ |=S ψ ′, X′ ⊆X, and x ′ ∈D(X′).
Proof. (⇒) Obviously, any explanation is a pseudo-explanation.
(⇐) Let (ψ ′,X′ = x ′) be a pseudo-explanation of φ relative to S such that ψ |=S ψ ′.
We show that there exists some explanation (ψ ′′,X′ = x ′) of φ relative to S such that
ψ ′ |=S ψ ′′. Let ψ∗ be a weakest formula ψ ′′ such that ψ ′ |=S ψ ′′ and ES2 holds for
(ψ ′′,X′ = x ′). We claim that (ψ∗,X′ = x ′) is an explanation of φ relative to S . Since
ψ |=S ψ∗, this will prove the result.
Towards a contradiction, suppose (ψ ′′,X′′ = x ′′), where ψ∗ |=S ψ ′′, is such that it
satisfies ES2 and either (i) X′′ ⊂ X′ and x ′′ = x ′|X′′, or (ii) ψ∗ ≡S ψ ′′. In case (i), each
causal model M selected by ψ ′ is also selected by ψ∗, and thus by ψ ′′; furthermore,
X′′ = x ′′ is a weak cause of φ in M under u for each (M,u) ∈ S such that M |= ψ ′′
and (M,u) |= X′′ = x ′′. This contradicts that (ψ ′,X′ = x ′) is a pseudo-explanation of φ
relative to S . Thus, X′′ = X′ must hold, and case (ii) must apply. However, this means
that ψ∗ is not a weakest formula ψ ′′ such that ψ ′ |=S ψ ′′ and (ψ ′′,X′ = x ′) satisfies ES2,
which is a contradiction. This proves that (ψ∗,X′ = x ′) is an explanation of φ relative
to S . ✷
Theorem 6.9. Problem Explanation Existence for situations is P3 -complete.
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Proof. We first prove membership in P . By Lemmas 6.6 and 6.8, it is sufficient to guess3
someX′ ⊆X, x ′ ∈D(X′), andM′ = {M1, . . . ,Mn} ⊆M such that (i) {M ∈M |M |=ψ}
⊆M′, (ii) M1, . . . ,Mn  M for all M ∈M \M′, and ES1, ES2 where “M ∈M′”
replaces “M |= ψ”, ES3′, and ES4 hold. Task (i) can be done in polynomial time with an
NP-oracle, while task (ii) can be done, by Theorem 6.4, in nondeterministic polynomial
time with a P2 -oracle. Checking ES1 and ES4 is possible in polynomial time, while
ES2 can be checked, by Proposition 6.1 and Theorem 3.3, in polynomial time with a P2
oracle. Finally, checking ES3′ is in P2 , since deciding the existence of a counterexample
to minimality is in P2 . In summary, the whole procedure runs in nondeterministic
polynomial time using a P2 oracle. Hence, Explanation Existence is in 
P
3 .
For the case of unrestricted models, P3 -hardness is inherited from the 
P
3 -comple-
teness of Explanation Existence for context explanations, which occurs as a special case
of Explanation Existence for situations. We show P3 -hardness for the binary case by a
reduction from deciding non-subsumption between causal models, which is P3 -complete
by Theorem 6.4: Given two causal modelsM1 = (U1,V ,F1) andM2 = (U2,V ,F2), decide
whether M1 M2. Without loss of generality, we assume that U1 =U2 =U .
The reduction is similar in spirit to the one in the proof of Theorem 6.7, yet different.
We construct a causal formula ψ , a set of endogenous variables X, an event φ, and a set of
situations S , such that some explanation (ψ ′,X′ = x ′) of φ relative to S exists such that
ψ |=S ψ ′, X′ ⊆X, and x ′ ∈D(X′) iff M1 M2.
The set of situations is defined by S = {Si = (Mi,ui) | 3  i  6}, where the causal
models Mi = (Ui,Vi,Fi) and the contexts ui are given as follows. For i ∈ {3, . . . ,6},
the sets of exogenous and endogenous variables are defined by Ui = U ∪ {U0} and
Vi = V ∪ {X0,X1, Y,T }, respectively, where D(X) = {0,1} for all X ∈ {U0,X0,X1,
Y,T }. For i ∈ {3, . . . ,6}, the functions Fi = {F iX |X ∈ Vi} are defined as follows:
• F3 = {F 3X0 = 0, F 3X1 = 0, F 3Y = (U0 = 0)∧ (X0 = 1), F 3T = 1} ∪ F1;
• F4 = {F 4X0 = 0, F 4X1 = 0, F 4Y = (U0 = 0)∧ (X0 = 1), F 4T = 1} ∪ F2;
• F5 = {F 5X0 = 0, F 5X1 = 0, F 5Y =X1, F 5T = 0} ∪ {F 5X = 0 |X ∈ V };
• F6 = {F 6X0 = 1, F 6X1 = 0, F 6Y = (T = 1)∧ (X0 = 1∨X1 = 1), F 6T = 0} ∪
{F 6X = 0 |X ∈ V }.
The contexts u3, . . . , u6 are arbitrary such that u3(U0)= 0 and u4(U0)= 1.
Observe now that the situations Si have the following weak causes of Y = 0 involving
only variables in X = {X0,X1}: S3 has X0 = 0 and X0 = 0 ∧ X1 = 0, S4 has no weak
cause, S5 has X1 = 0 and X0 = 0∧X1 = 0, and S6 has X1 = 0.
Define now ψ = T = 0, φ = Y = 0, and X = {X0,X1}. Note that ψ selects the models
M5 and M6.
Intuitively, S5 and S6 create a single candidate event, X0 = 0 ∧ X1 = 0, for an
explanation (ψ ′,X′ = x ′) of φ as desired. This candidate is good if S3 but not S4 can
be respected in the explanation, i.e., ψ ′ selects M3 but not M4, which is equivalent to
M1 M2.
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Formally, in any explanation (ψ ′,X′ = x ′) for Y = 0 relative to S such that ψ |=S ψ ′,
the set X′ must be different from X0; otherwise, X′ = x ′ is not a weak cause under u5 in
M5 and under u6 in M6, which means that ES2 is violated. Thus, X′ must include X1. On
the other hand, X = {X1} and x ′|X1 = 0 must hold, since otherwise ES4 is violated. Since
X0 = 1 ∧X1 = 0 is not weak cause of Y = 0 in M6 under u6, we have that X′ = x ′ must
be of form X0 = 0∧X1 = 0.
We claim that some (ψ ′,X0 = 0∧X1 = 0)with ψ |=S ψ ′ is an explanation of φ relative
to S iff M1 M2 holds.
Suppose that (ψ ′,X0 = 0∧X1 = 0) is an explanation of φ relative to S . We must have
ψ ′ ≡S ψ : indeed, (ψ,X0 = 0∧X1 = 0) is not a pseudo-explanation of φ, since ES3′ fails,
which is witnessed by (ψ,X1 = 0) satisfying ES2. Therefore, ψ ′ must select either M3 or
M4. Since X allows no weak cause of Y = 0 in M4 under u4, ψ ′ must not select M4. This
implies M3 M4, which in turn implies that M1 M2.
Conversely, suppose that M1  M2. Then, M3  M4, and the set {M3,M5,M6} is
definable by a formula ψ ′ such that ψ |=S ψ ′. Consider (ψ ′,X0 = 0 ∧X1 = 0). Clearly,
ES1 holds for φ = Y = 0 and ES4 holds for X0 = 0 ∧ X1 = 0. Also ES2 holds, since
X0 = 0 ∧ X1 = 0 is a weak cause of Y = 0 in M3 under u3 and in M5 under u5.
Furthermore, neither for (ψ ′,X0 = 0) nor for (ψ ′,X1 = 0) is ES2 satisfied, since X0 = 0 is
not a weak cause of Y = 0 in M5 under u5 and X1 = 0 is not a weak cause of Y = 0 in M3
under u3. Thus, (ψ ′,X0 = 0 ∧X1 = 0) is a pseudo-explanation of φ relative to S . From
Lemma 6.8, it follows that some explanation (ψ ′′,X0 = 0 ∧X1 = 0) of Y = 0 relative to
S exists (in fact, ψ ′′ ≡S ψ ′ must hold).
As the above reduction is polynomial, this shows P3 -hardness. ✷
We remark that the existence of specific explanations may have higher complexity. For
example, deciding the existence of an explanation (ψ ′,X′ = x ′) where ψ ′ = ψ , is both
P3 -hard and 
P
3 -hard; the latter is implicit in the proof of Theorem 6.7.
6.3. Causal formulas with exogenous variables
We now give some remarks on the impact of the language of events that is considered
in defining explanations and situations. In this paper, like in [25,26], primitive events
involve only endogenous variables. The setting stated in [17] is slightly more liberal
and also admits exogenous variables to occur in primitive events. While such enhanced
expressiveness does not increase the complexity results for explanations in Sections 3–5,
it allows to simplify some of the technical hardness proofs. On the other hand, the
higher expressiveness of causal formulas which may also involve exogenous variables
via primitive events implies a refinement of the subsumption and indiscernibility relation,
which is also easier to test: The characterization of M1, . . . ,Mn  M in Theorem 6.3,
where M = (U,V,F ) and Mi = (U,V,Fi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, can be replaced by the
following simpler condition:
(∗∗) There exists some u ∈ D(U) such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a
causal formula [Y ← y]X = x , where Y is a (possibly empty) set of endogenous
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variables and X is a single variable, such that (i) (M,u) |= [Y ← y]X = x , and (ii)
(Mi,u) |= [Y ← y]X= x .
The check of this condition is easily seen to be NP-complete. Therefore, the
subsumption test M1 M2 (respectively, equivalence test M1 ≡M2) is co-NP-complete
rather than P3 -complete, and thus two levels lower in the polynomial hierarchy.
Consequently, it does not dominate the complexity of the conditions ES1–ES4; the
same algorithm for checking an explanation, performed in this setting, yields then a DP2
(respectively, DP) upper bound in the general (respectively, binary) case. A matching lower
bound is inherited from the complexity of Explanation in the basic setting, as it is a special
case of situations, and thus the problem is complete for DP2 (respectively, DP). Similarly,
for the problem Explanation Existence, we obtain completeness for P3 and 
P
2 in the
general and the binary case, respectively.
7. Related work
In this section, we give a comparison of our work to related work on complexity of
explanations in the areas of abduction and of Bayesian networks.
7.1. Abductive explanations
Abduction has been recognized as an important principle of common-sense reasoning,
and plays an important role in many AI problems including diagnosis, planning, or
natural language processing to mention but a few. One of the uses of abduction is to
obtain explanations for observations, which loosely speaking is accomplished by a kind
of reversed modus ponens. There is quite some work on algorithms and complexity of
finding abductive explanations (e.g., [4,8,9,11,44,47]).
Roughly, in a logic-based setting, abductive explanations are defined as follows (cf. [35,
47]). Given some background knowledge T , which is a theory, i.e., a set of sentences in
some logic, and a set of observations O , which are typically facts, a set of sentences E
from a set of hypotheses H is an explanation of O from T , iff
1. T ∪E is satisfiable, i.e., not contradictory, and
2. T ∪ E |= O , i.e., the observations are logically entailed from the background
knowledge and the explanation, under a notion of logical entailment |=.
Usually, further conditions are imposed on E in order to single out most plausible
explanations. A standard such condition is the application of Occam’s razor, i.e.,
minimality in terms of set inclusion.
While causal and abductive explanations, in a standard logical setting such as above,
are apparently different concepts, they have similar complexity. In particular, deciding
the existence of an abductive explanation in the propositional context (i.e., T , O , and H
are in classical propositional logic) is P2 -complete, as shown in [11]. This matches our
respective result on causal explanations for binary causal models. In fact, computing causal
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explanations can be polynomially transformed into computing abductive explanations in
this case, and vice versa.
In the case of causal models with non-binary domains, explanations are one level higher
up in the Polynomial Hierarchy, and deciding the existence of a causal explanation is
P3 -complete. This matches, interestingly, the complexity of abductive explanations from
disjunctive logic programs under the stable respectively answer set semantics. In this
setting, the background theory T is a propositional disjunctive logic program, H and E
are set of atoms, and |= is standard cautious inference, i.e., truth in all stable models
respectively answer sets of a program. As was shown in [12], deciding the existence of
an abductive explanation is P3 -complete in this scenario. Thus, deciding the existence of
causal and of abductive LP explanations is polynomially intertranslatable, which extends
easily to computing some causal respectively abductive LP explanation, and computational
engines could be mutually exploited.
The issue of efficient transformations of causal into abductive explanations, as well
as into related reasoning tasks of nonmonotonic formalisms, is an interesting subject for
further work, which may also be exploited for obtaining rapid prototype implementations.
E.g., by mapping binary causal explanations to abductive explanations, (extended) variants
of the Truth Maintenance System (cf. [44]) could be utilized for this purpose, or the
diagnostic frontend of the DLV system [10]. Another possibility would be an encoding
of causal explanations in Answer Set Programming, and using the DLV engine to compute
solutions. For the case of general causal explanations, reductions to QBF solvers such as
[5,19,42] could be used.
7.2. Bayesian networks
After Cooper’s well-known intractability result [7] for probabilistic inference in
Bayesian networks, a number of papers in this area have investigated complexity issues
for reasoning and in particular for explanation finding.
A dominating notion of explanation in the probabilistic AI literature is the maximum
a posteriori explanation (MAP, alias most probable explanation [33,34]), which is an
assignment to all variables given a partial assignment to the variables in a Bayesian
network, such that its probability is maximum. Some complexity results for MAPs have
been derived, which however are only weakly related to our results for causal explanations.
In particular, computing a MAP in a Bayesian network is NP-hard [49], and the same
applies to computing a MAP approximation [1]; on the other hand, this is feasible in
polynomial time with an NP oracle.
This result on computing a MAP is quite different from our results on α-partial
explanations, for two reasons: firstly, MAPs are computed from the set of all contexts,
which is not part of the input. In this setting, α-partial explanations have higher complexity.
Secondly, MAPs are single contexts which maximize probability for a given evidence,
while α-partial explanations single out subsets of contexts which sensibly respect relevant
information [27].
From the computational side, it is more suitable to compare deciding P(X = x) > 0 in a
Bayesian network with our problem Partial Explanation under succinct context sets, where
C contains all possible contexts and P emerges from independent exogenous variables.
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However, the former problem is NP-complete [7], while the latter is, by our results,
P4 -complete and thus much harder. We may thus expect a similar relationship between
computing the explanatory power and the probability P(X = x) in a Bayesian network,
which can be done in polynomial time with the help of a #P oracle [43].
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered explanations in Halpern and Pearl’s structural-
model approach to causality from a computational perspective, and we have obtained a
number of complexity results which precisely characterize the intrinsic difficulty of major
computational tasks on explanations.
Our results give a clear picture of the complexity of explanations in the case of general
structural models, as well as under the restriction to the case where all variables are binary.
As we have shown, causal explanations reside at the third level of the Polynomial Hierarchy
(PH) in the basic setting, and thus are, computationally speaking, harder to compute than,
for example, abductive explanations in the standard logic-based setting, which are at the
second level of PH. Intuitively, causal explanations harbor three intermingled sources of
complexity, which make the concept difficult:
(1) the, in general, exponential set of candidates X = x for an explanation formed from
variables X in a given set X′ of variables;
(2) condition AC2(b), which informally is a kind of validity test ensuring that X alone is
sufficient to bring about the change of the event φ to ¬φ, and thus impacts on φ; and
(3) minimality of explanations, which implies an exponential set of candidates in
condition EX3/ES3 for spoiling a candidate explanation.
The complexity of causal explanations further increases, as demonstrated for the recogni-
tion problem, under a natural concise form of model representation by two levels in PH. In
particular, the recognition problems was proved to be P4 -complete, and thus is, compared
to validity checking in classical propositional logic, a rather complex problem.
Some of our hardness results remain valid under further restrictions, such as a
boundedness condition on the causal model [14,18]. In particular, all hardness results from
Tables 1–3 in Sections 3–5 hold for primitive events φ. Thus, complex events are not
a source of complexity. However, to avoid a proliferation of results, we did not further
consider such restrictions here.
For “efficient” algorithms to generate explanations or “best” α-partial explanations,
we can conclude the following. Both must solve an inherent P3 -hard problem; thus,
simple backtracking is infeasible, as well as polynomial reductions to a SAT solver or
a computational logic system which can handle problems with complexity up to P2 , such
as DLV [13,36]. However, an explanation may be computed using nested backtracking, or
flat backtracking calling a subroutine for P2 tasks (e.g., calls to DLV). A further possible
perspective are translations to QBF-solvers, which proved valuable in other applications
[42]. We can compute an α-partial explanation similarly. Computing a best one amounts
to an optimization problem, which can be solved by binary search over the range [0,1] of
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α, and thus in polynomial time with a P -oracle. A substantially faster algorithm seems3
unlikely to exist.
Once the basic results about the complexity of a framework are known, and intractability
of some tasks has been evidenced, a natural next step of research is to identify cases of
lower complexity, and in particular to find islands of tractability. For that, meaningful
restrictions must be found which eliminate the various sources of complexity, which is
not straightforward.
While the complexity results for explanations established in this paper may look
discouraging, and leave us with little hope for tractable cases, it turned out that there
are meaningful restrictions of causal models for which explanations have polynomial
complexity. In a companion paper [15,16] to [14,18] and the present paper, we describe
nontrivial syntactic restrictions on causal models under which the notions of weak causes
and explanations are tractable. In particular, we have identified a hierarchy of tractable
classes, starting with simple causal trees, i.e., the causal graphs are trees, over layered
causal graphs, i.e., the causal graphs can be layered so as to permit a step by step
propagation of effects, to a general class of decomposable causal graphs. On such causal
models, small weak causes under explanations can be computed efficiently under further
assumptions which are needed to gain tractability. However, the technical definitions and
the characterizations are far too involved to be discussed here; we refer the interested reader
to [15,16] for details.
Hence, there are some positive results on the computation of causal explanations for
certain instances already. It remains, however, to find other classes of instances that have
lower complexity, and in particular that guarantee tractability; delineating the tractability
frontier is a challenging task for future work. Likewise, the development of suitable
algorithms, continuing and extending the work of Hopkins [30], is indispensable for
making the structural-model approach amenable to efficient implementation and use in
practice.
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.3 (continued). Hardness for P3 is shown by a reduction from
deciding whether a given QBF Φ = ∃B ∀C ∃Dγ is valid, where γ is a propositional
formula on the variables B = {B1, . . . ,Bl}, C = {C1, . . . ,Cm}, and D = {D1, . . . ,Dn}. We
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constructM = (U,V,F ),X ⊆ V , C ⊆D(U), and φ as in the statement of the theorem such
that Φ is valid iff some X′ ⊆X and x ′ ∈D(X′) exist such that X′ = x ′ is an explanation
of φ relative to C .
We define U = {I,U0,U0′, . . . ,Ul,Ul ′}, where D(I) = {0, . . . , l + 1} and D(S) =
{0,1} for all S ∈ U \ {I }. Let C = {u0, u0′, . . . , ul, ul ′, ul+1}, where ui (respectively, ui ′) is
the unique u ∈D(U) such that εi(u) (respectively, εi ′(u)) holds, and εi (respectively, εi ′)
for every i ∈ {0, . . . , l + 1} (respectively, i ∈ {0, . . . , l}) is defined by:
εi = I = i ∧U0 = 0∧U0′ = 1∧
l∧
i=1
(Ui = 0∧Ui ′ = 0),
εi
′ = I = i ∧U0 = 0∧U0′ = 0∧
l∧
i=1
(Ui = 0∧Ui ′ = 0).
We defineM = (U,V,F ) as follows. Let V = B∪B ′ ∪C∪D∪{X0,X0′,E,E′, Y }, where
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where γ ′ is obtained from γ by replacing each S ∈ B ∪ C ∪D by “S = 1”. We are now
ready to define the functions F = {FS | S ∈ V } as follows:
• FBi =Ui and FBi ′ =Ui ′ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l},• FX0 =U0 and FX0 ′ =U0′,• FS = 0 for all S ∈ C ∪ {E,E′},
• FS =X0 +E for all S ∈D,
• FY = 1 iff φ′1 ∨ φ′2 ∨ φ′3 is true.
Let X = B ∪B ′ ∪ {X0,X0′}. Let φ be Y = 1. Notice that φ is primitive.
For every truth assignment τ to the variables in B , denote by [B/τ(B)] the
substitution [B1/τ(B1), . . . ,Bl/τ (Bl)], and we define ατ = α [B/τ(B)]. Let x0 = 0, and
let u ∈ D(U) with X0(u) = x0. Then, X0 = x0 is a weak cause of ατ under u iff
∃C ∀D¬γ [B/τ(B)] is valid [14,18]. That is, X0 = x0 is not a weak cause of ατ under
u iff ∀C ∃Dγ [B/τ(B)] is valid. Thus, Proposition 2.5 implies the following:
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(∗) For every X′ ⊆ B ∪ B ′ ∪ {X0,X0′} with X0 ∈ X′, it holds that X′ = X′(u) is not a
weak cause of ατ under u iff ∀C ∃Dγ [B/τ(B)] is valid.
We now show that Φ is valid iff some X′ ⊆ X and x ′ ∈D(X′) exist such that X′ = x ′
is an explanation of φ relative to C .
(⇐)Assume that someX′ ⊆X and x ′ ∈D(X′) exist such thatX′ = x ′ is an explanation
of φ relative to C . Then,
• x ′(S)= 0 for all S ∈X′ ∩ (B ∪B ′ ∪ {X0}),
as otherwise X′(u) = x ′ for all u ∈ C , and thus EX4 is violated. For every i ∈ {0, . . . , l},
it holds either X′(ui)= x ′ or X′(ui ′)= x ′. Thus, X′ ∩ {Bi,Bi ′} = ∅ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l},
as otherwise X′ = x ′ is not a weak cause of φ under any u ∈ {ui, ui ′}, and thus EX2 is
violated. It follows that
• X0 ∈X′, and
• |X′ ∩ {Bi,Bi ′}| = 1
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, as otherwise X′ = x ′ is not a weak cause of φ under any u ∈ {u0, u0′},
and thus EX2 is violated. It holds
• X0′ ∈X′,
as otherwise X′(u)= x ′ for all u ∈ C , and thus EX4 is violated. We have
• x ′(X0′)= 0,
as otherwise, by Proposition 2.5, X′′ = x ′′ is a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C , where
X′′ =X′ \ {X0′} and x ′′ = x ′|X′′, and thus EX3 is violated. Observe now that X′′ = x ′′ is
not a weak cause of φ under u= ul+1, whereX′′ =X′ \{X0′} and x ′′ = x ′|X′′, as otherwise
EX3 is violated. Let the truth assignment τ to the variables in B be defined by τ (S) = 0
iff S ∈ X′ for all S ∈ B . We now show that X′′ = x ′′ is not a weak cause of ατ under u.
Towards a contradiction, assume the contrary. Thus, there exists some W ⊆ V \X′′, x¯ ′′ ∈
D(X′′), andw ∈D(W) such that¬ατ
x¯ ′′w(u) and α
τ
x ′′wzˆ(u) for all Ẑ ⊆ V \(X′′ ∪W) and zˆ=
Ẑ(u). Here, we can assume that x¯ ′′(X0)= 1, x¯ ′′(S)= 0 for all S ∈X′′\{X0}, {E′} ∪ ((B ∪
B ′)\X′′)⊆W , and w(S)= 1 for all S ∈ {E′} ∪ ((B ∪B ′) \X′′). Hence, it holds ¬αx¯ ′′w(u)
and αx ′′wzˆ(u) for all Ẑ⊆V \ (X′′ ∪W) and zˆ = Ẑ(u). Thus, ¬φx¯ ′′w(u) and φx ′′wzˆ(u) for
all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X′′ ∪W) and zˆ= Ẑ(u). As X′′(u)= x ′′ and φ(u), it follows that X′′ = x ′′ is
a weak cause of φ under u, which is a contradiction. Hence, X′′ = x ′′ is not a weak cause
of ατ under u. By (∗), it follows that ∀C ∃Dγ [B/τ(B)] is valid. That is, Φ is valid.
(⇒) Assume that Φ is valid. That is, there exists a truth assignment τ to the variables
in B such that ∀C ∃Dγ [B/τ(B)] is valid. Define X′ = {X0,X0′} ∪ {S ∈ B | τ (B) =
0} ∪ {S′ ∈ B ′ | τ (B) = 1} and x ′(S) = 0 for all S ∈ X′. We now show that X′ = x ′ is
an explanation of φ relative to C . EX1 holds, as φ(u) for all u ∈ C . EX2 holds, as X′ = x ′
is weak cause of φ under every ui ′ with i ∈ {0, . . . , l}. EX4 holds, as X′(u0) = x ′ and
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X′(u0′)= x ′. We next show that EX3 holds. Towards a contradiction, assume the contrary.
That is, there exists some X′′ ⊂ X′ such that X′′ = x ′′ is a weak cause of φ under every
u ∈ C withX′′(u)= x ′′, where x ′′ = x ′|X′′. It holdsX′′ ∩{Bi,Bi ′} = ∅ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l},
as otherwise X′′ = x ′′ is not a weak cause of φ under any u ∈ {ui, ui ′}. It follows that
X0 ∈ X′′, as otherwise X′′ = x ′′ is not a weak cause of φ under any u ∈ {u0, u0′}. It thus
follows X′′ = X′ \ {X0′}. Hence, X′′ = x ′′ is a weak cause of φ under u= ul+1. That is,
someW ⊆ V \X′′, x¯ ′′ ∈D(X′′), andw ∈D(W) exist such that¬φx¯ ′′w(u) and φx ′′wzˆ(u) for
all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X′′ ∪W) and zˆ= Ẑ(u). As ¬φx¯ ′′w(u), it follows that E′ ∈W and w(E′)= 1.
As φx ′′w(u), for every S ∈ (B ∪B ′) \X′′, it holds either S(u)= 1 or S ∈W and w(S)= 1.
As ¬φx¯ ′′w(u), it thus follows that x¯ ′′(S)= 0 for all S ∈X′′ \ {X0}. Hence, ¬αx¯ ′′w(u) and
αx ′′wzˆ(u) for all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X′′ ∪W) and zˆ= Ẑ(u). That is, ¬ατx¯ ′′w(u) and ατx ′′wzˆ(u) for all
Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X′′ ∪W) and zˆ= Ẑ(u). As X′′(u)= x ′′ and ατ (u), this shows that X′′ = x ′′ is a
weak cause of ατ under u. By (∗), it follows that ∀C ∃Dγ [B/τ(B)] is not valid, which is
a contradiction. This shows that EX3 holds. ✷
Proof of Theorem 3.5 (continued). We define U = {I,U0,U0′, . . . ,Uk,Uk ′}, where
D(I) = {0, . . . , l + 1} and D(S) = {0,1} for all S ∈ U \ {I }. Let C = {u0, u0′, . . . , ul,
ul
′, ul+1}, where ui (respectively, ui ′) is the unique u ∈D(U) such that εi(u) (respectively,
εi
′(u)) holds, and εi (respectively, εi ′) for every i ∈ {0, . . . , l + 1} (respectively, i ∈
{0, . . . , l}) is defined as follows:
εi = I = i ∧U0 = 0∧U0′ = 1∧
l∧
i=1
(Ui = 0∧Ui ′ = 0),
εi
′ = I = i ∧U0 = 0∧U0′ = 0∧
l∧
i=1
(Ui = 0∧Ui ′ = 0).
We define M = (U,V,F ) as follows. The endogenous variables are given by V = B ∪
B ′ ∪C ∪ {X0, X0′,E′, Y }, where B ′ = {B1′, . . . ,Bl ′} and D(S)= {0,1} for all S ∈ V . Let
α =X0 = 0∨ γ ′,
φ′1 =
(






































where γ ′ is obtained from γ by replacing each S ∈ B ∪C by “S = 1”. We are now ready
to define the functions F = {FS | S ∈ V } as follows:
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• FBi =Ui and FB ′ =Ui ′ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l},i• FX0 =U0 and FX0 ′ =U0′,• FS = 0 for all S ∈ C ∪ {E′},
• FY = 1 iff φ′1 ∨ φ′2 ∨ φ′3 is true.
Let X = B ∪B ′ ∪ {X0,X0′}. Let φ be Y = 1. Notice that φ is primitive. For every truth
assignment τ to the variables in B , we denote by [B/τ(B)] the substitution [B1/τ(B1),
. . . ,Bl/τ (Bl)], and we define ατ = α [B/τ(B)]. Let x0 = 0, and let u ∈ D(U) with
X0(u) = x0. Then, X0 = x0 is a weak cause of ατ under u iff ∃C¬γ [B/τ(B)] is valid.
That is, X0 = x0 is not a weak cause of ατ under u iff ∀C γ [B/τ(B)] is valid. Thus,
Proposition 2.5 implies the following fact:
(∗) For every X′ ⊆ B ∪ B ′ ∪ {X0,X0′} with X0 ∈ X′, it holds that X′ = X′(u) is not a
weak cause of ατ under u iff ∀C γ [B/τ(B)] is valid.
Using (∗), by a similar line of argumentation as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, it follows
that Φ is valid iff some X′ ⊆X and x ′ ∈D(X′) exist such that X′ = x ′ is an explanation
of φ relative to C . ✷
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.3 (continued). We construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), φ,
C ⊆ D(U), P, and α as in the statement of the theorem, such that X = x is an α-partial
explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff the number of valid formulas among Φ1, . . . ,Φk is
even.
For i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, define the causal models Mi = (Ui,Vi,Fi) as follows. The
exogenous and endogenous variables are defined byUi = {Ei} and Vi =Ai∪Bi∪{Ci,Gi},
respectively. Define D(S)= {0,1,2} for all S ∈ Bi , and D(S)= {0,1} for all S ∈ Ui ∪Vi \








∨ (Ci = 0)∨
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where γ ′i is obtained from γi by replacing each S ∈ Ai ∪Bi by “S = 1”. The functions in
Fi = {F iS | S ∈ Vi} are defined as follows:
• F iGi =Ei ,
• F iS = 0 for all S ∈ {Ci} ∪Ai ,
• F iS =Gi +Ci for all S ∈Bi .
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let Xi = {Gi}, and define xi ∈D(Xi) and ui ∈D(Ui) by xi(Gi)=
0 and ui(Ei)= 0. Then, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Xi = xi is a weak cause of φi under ui
in Mi iff Φi is valid (the construction is similar as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, the only
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difference is that we have F i = Ei here, instead of F i = 0). Observe also that φi(u)Gi Gi
holds for all u ∈D(Ui).
Define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) by U = U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Uk ∪ {E}, where D(E) =
{0, . . . , k}, V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vk ∪ {H }, and F = F1 ∪ · · · ∪ Fk ∪ {FH }, where


















and εi and ε′i are defined as follows for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}:












For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let ui (respectively, u′i ) be the unique u ∈D(U) such that εi(u)
(respectively, ε′i (u)). Let Y = {H }, and let φ be Y = 1. Let C = {u1, . . . , uk, u′1, . . . , u′k},
P(u) = 1 /2k for all u ∈ C , and α = 1 /2k. Define X = {G1, . . . ,Gk} and x = x1 · · ·xk
(= 0 · · ·0).
Observe that φ is primitive, P is the uniform distribution over C , and φ(u) for all u ∈ C .
By Proposition 2.5, the following holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, all X′ ⊆X, and x ′ = x|X′:
(i) If Xi ⊆X′, then X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of φ under ui iff Φi is valid.
(ii) If i is even and Xi−1 ⊆X′, then X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of φ under u′i
iff Φi−1 is valid.
(iii) If i is odd, then X′ = x ′ is not a weak cause of φ under u′i .
(iv) If Xi ⊆X′, then X′ = x ′ is not a weak cause of φ under ui .
By Proposition 4.1, CφX=x is the set of all u ∈ C such that either (a) X(u) = x , or
(b) X(u) = x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. By (i), it thus follows CφX=x ={u′1, . . . , u′k} ∪ {ui | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Φi is valid}.
We now show that X = x is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P) iff the
number of valid formulas among Φ1, . . . ,Φk is even.
(⇒) Assume that X= x is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P). In particular,
X = x is an explanation of φ relative to CφX=x . Towards a contradiction, assume that the
number of valid formulas among Φ1, . . . ,Φk is odd. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , k} be the smallest
index such thatΦj is not valid. Notice that j is even. We defineX′ =X\Xj and x ′ = x|X′.
The set of all u ∈ CφX=x such that X′(u) = x ′ is given by C ′ = {u′j } ∪ {u1, . . . , uj−1} (as
Φj implies Φj−1, for every j ∈ {2, . . . , k}). By (i) and (ii), X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of
φ under every u ∈ C ′. That is, X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ CφX=x with
X′(u) = x ′, which violates EX3, and thus contradicts X = x being an explanation of φ
relative to CφX=x .
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(⇐) Assume that the number of valid formulas among Φ1, . . . ,Φk is even. We now
show that X = x is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ). By Proposition 4.1,
it is sufficient to show that (a) X = x is an explanation of φ relative to CφX=x , and (b)
P(CφX=x |X = x)  α. We first prove (a) by showing that EX1–EX4 hold. Clearly, EX1
and EX2 hold. Observe that u1′ ∈ CφX=x . As Φ1 is valid, we also have u1 ∈ CφX=x . Hence,
as X(u′1) = x and X(u1) = x , also EX4 holds. We next show that EX3 holds. Towards a
contradiction, assume that someX′ ⊂X exists such thatX′ = x ′ is a weak cause of φ under
all u ∈ CφX=x with X′(u)= x ′, where x ′ = x|X′. Let Xj ∈X \X′ such that j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
is minimal. As u′j ∈ CφX=x and X′(u′j ) = x ′, it follows that X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of
φ under u′j . By (iii), j is even. By (ii), Φj−1 is valid. By (iv), uj does not belong to
CφX=x . That is, Φj is not valid. But this contradicts the number of valid formulas among
Φ1, . . . ,Φk being even. Thus, also EX3 holds. Clearly, (b) follows from EX4 and P being
the uniform distribution over C . ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.6 (continued). We construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), φ,
C ⊆D(U), and P as required, such that (v1, . . . , vk) is the bit-vector representation of the
explanatory power of X = x multiplied with∑k−1j=0 2j .
For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, define Mi = (Ui,Vi,Fi) and Xi ⊆ Vi as in the proof of
Theorem 4.3. We define M = (U,V,F ) by U = U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Uk ∪ {E}, where D(E) =
{0, . . . , k}, V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vk ∪ {H }, and F = F1 ∪ · · · ∪ Fk ∪ {FH }, where











and εi and ε′i are defined as follows for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}:












For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let ui (respectively, u′i ) be the unique u ∈D(U) such that εi(u)
(respectively, ε′i (u)). Let Y = {H }, and let φ be Y = 1. We define C = {u1, . . . , uk,
u′1, . . . , u′k}, P(u′i ) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and P(ui) = 2i−1 /
∑k−1
j=0 2j for all i ∈{1, . . . , k}. We define X = {G1, . . . ,Gk} and x = x1 · · ·xk .
Observe that φ is primitive. Moreover, φ(u) for all u ∈ C , and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}:
(i) X = x is a weak cause of φ under ui iff Φi is valid.
(ii) If X′ ⊆X and x ′ = x|X′, then X′ = x ′ is not a weak cause of φ under u′i .
By Proposition 4.1, CφX=x is the set of all u ∈ C such that either (a) X(u) = x ,
or (b) X(u) = x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. By (i), it thus follows
CφX=x = {u′1, . . . , u′k} ∪ {ui | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Φi is valid}. By (ii), X = x is an explanation
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of φ relative to Cφ . Thus, X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ). ItsX=x
explanatory power is the sum of all P(ui) = 2i−1 /∑k−1j=0 2j with i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such
that Φi is valid. ✷
Theorem B.1. α-Partial Explanation is PNP‖ -complete in the binary case.
Proof. As for membership, recall that X = x is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to
(C,P ) iff (a) X= x is an explanation of φ relative to CφX=x , and (b) P(CφX=x |X = x) α.
By Proposition 4.1, CφX=x is the set of all u ∈ C such that either (i) X(u) = x , or (ii)
X(u) = x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. Deciding (i) is polynomial, and, by
Theorem 2.6, deciding (ii) is in NP in the binary case. Thus, computing CφX=x is in FPNP‖ in
the binary case. Once CφX=x is given, deciding (a) is possible with two NP-oracle calls, by
Theorem 3.4, and deciding (b) is polynomial. As two rounds of parallel NP-oracle queries
in a polynomial-time computation can be replaced by a single one [3], the problem is in
PNP‖ .
Hardness for PNP‖ is shown by a reduction from the following PNP‖ -complete problem
[51]. Given k propositional formulas γi , i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, where each γi is defined on
the variables Ai = {Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,mi }, decide whether the number of tautologies among
γ1, . . . , γk is even. Without loss of generality, k is even, the Ai’s are pairwise disjoint,
γ1 is not a tautology, and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, if γj is a tautology, then also
γj+1 [51]. We construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), φ, C ⊆ D(U), P, and α as
required, such that X = x is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff the number
of tautologies among γ1, . . . , γk is even. The construction is similar to the one in the proof
of Theorem 4.3. Roughly, we replace the part for P2 -hardness of deciding general weak
cause by a new part for NP-hardness of deciding binary weak cause.
For i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, define the causal models Mi = (Ui,Vi,Fi) as follows. The
exogenous and endogenous variables are defined by Ui = {Ei} and Vi = Ai ∪ {Gi},
respectively, where D(S) = {0,1} for all S ∈ Ui ∪ Vi . We define the functions in Fi =
{F iS | S ∈ Vi} as follows:
• F iGi =Ei ,
• F iS = 0 for all S ∈Ai .
We then define φi = Gi = 0∨γi ′, where γi ′ is obtained from γi by replacing each
S ∈ Ai by “S = 1”. For each i∈{1, . . . , k}, let Xi = {Gi}, and define xi ∈ D(Xi) and
ui∈D(Ui) by xi(Gi)= 0 and ui(Ei)= 0. Then, for every i∈{1, . . . , k}, Xi = xi is a weak
cause of φi under ui in Mi iff γi is not a tautology.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) as follows. The exogenous and endogenous
variables are given by U =U1 ∪ · · · ∪Uk ∪{E} and V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪Vk ∪{H }, respectively,
where D(E)= {0, . . . , k} and D(H)= {0,1}. The functions are given by F = F1 ∪ · · · ∪
Fk ∪ {FH }, where
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and εi and ε′i are defined as follows for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}:












For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let ui (respectively, u′i ) be the unique u ∈D(U) such that εi(u)
(respectively, ε′i (u)). Let Y = {H }, and let φ be Y = 1. Let C = {u1, . . . , uk, u′1, . . . , u′k},
P(u) = 1 /2k for all u ∈ C , and α = 1 /2k. Define X = {G1, . . . ,Gk} and x = x1 . . . xk .
Observe that φ is primitive, that φ(u) for all u ∈ C , and that P is the uniform distribution
over C . By Proposition 4.1, CφX=x is the set of all u ∈ C such that either (a) X(u) = x , or
(b) X(u)= x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. By Proposition 2.5, it thus follows
CφX=x = {u′1, . . . , u′k} ∪ {ui | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, γi is not a tautology}.
By a line of argumentation similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 4.3, it follows
that X = x is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P) iff the number of non-
tautologies among γ1, . . . , γk is even, that is, as k is even, iff the number of tautologies
among γ1, . . . , γk is even. ✷
Theorem B.2. α-Partial Explanation Existence is P2 -complete in the binary case.
Proof. As for membership in P2 , by Theorem B.1, deciding whether X′ = x ′ is an α-
partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) is in PNP‖ in the binary case. Thus, guessing some
X′ ⊆ X and x ′ ∈ D(X′), and deciding whether X′ = x ′ is an α-partial explanation of φ
relative to (C,P ) is in P2 in the binary case.
Hardness for P2 is shown by a reduction from Explanation Existence in the binary case
(see Theorem 3.5). Given an instance of it, let P be the uniform distribution on C , and let
α = 1. Then, X′ = x ′ is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff X′ = x ′ is an
explanation of φ relative to C . ✷
Theorem B.3. Partial Explanation is PNP‖ -complete in the binary case.
Proof. As for membership in PNP‖ , recall that X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative
to (C,P ) iff (a) X = x is an explanation of φ relative to CφX=x , and (b) CφX=x contains some
u such that X(u)= x and P(u) > 0. By the proof of Theorem B.1, computing CφX=x is in
FPNP‖ in the binary case. Once CφX=x is given, checking (a) is in DP in the binary case, by
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Theorem 3.4, and checking (b) is polynomial. As two rounds of parallel NP-oracle queries
in a polynomial-time computation can be replaced by a single one [3], Partial Explanation
is in PNP‖ in the binary case.
We next show PNP‖ -hardness. If P is the uniform distribution over C , then X = x is a
partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff X = x is a 1/|C|-partial explanation of φ
relative to (C,P ). By the proof of Theorem B.1, deciding the latter is complete for PNP‖ .
Thus, deciding whether X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) is PNP‖ -hard,
and hardness holds even if P is the uniform distribution over C . ✷
Theorem B.4. Explanatory Power is FPNP‖ -complete in the binary case.
Proof. We compute CφX=x and P(CφX=x |X= x). By the proof of Theorem B.1, the former
is in FPNP‖ in the binary case, while the latter is polynomial. Thus, Explanatory Power is in
FPNP‖ in the binary case.
Hardness for FPNP‖ is shown by a reduction from the following FPNP‖ -complete problem.
Given k propositional formulas γi , i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, where each γi is defined on the variables
Ai = {Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,mi }, compute the vector (v1, . . . , vk) ∈ {0,1}k such that vi = 1 iff γi
is not a tautology, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Without loss of generality, the Ai’s are pairwise
disjoint, and γ1 is not a tautology.
We construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), φ, C ⊆ D(U), and P as required,
such that (v1, . . . , vk) is the bit-vector representation of the explanatory power of X = x
multiplied with
∑k−1
j=0 2j . For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let Mi = (Ui,Vi,Fi) and Xi ⊆ Vi be
defined as in the proof of Theorem B.1. The rest of the construction is similar as in the proof
of Theorem 4.6. We define the causal modelM = (U,V,F ) as follows. The exogenous and
endogenous variables are given by U =U1 ∪ · · · ∪Uk ∪ {E} and V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪Vk ∪ {H },
respectively, where D(E) = {0, . . . , k} and D(H) = {0,1}. The functions are given by
F = F1 ∪ · · · ∪Fk ∪ {FH }, where











and εi and ε′i are defined as follows for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}:












For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let ui (respectively, u′i ) be the unique u ∈D(U) such that εi(u)
(respectively, ε′i (u)). Let Y = {H }, and let φ be Y = 1. We define C = {u1, . . . , uk,
u′1, . . . , u′k}, P(u′i ) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and P(ui) = 2i−1 /
∑k−1
j=0 2j for all i ∈{1, . . . , k}. We define X = {G1, . . . ,Gk} and x = x1 · · ·xk .
Observe that φ is primitive. Moreover, φ(u) for all u ∈ C , and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}:
T Eiter, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 154 (2004) 145–198 191
(i) X = x is a weak cause of φ under ui iff γi is not a tautology.
(ii) If X′ ⊆X and x ′ = x|X′, then X′ = x ′ is not a weak cause of φ under u′i .
By Proposition 4.1, CφX=x is the set of all u ∈ C such that either (a) X(u) = x , or
(b) X(u) = x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. By (i), it thus follows CφX=x ={u′1, . . . , u′k} ∪ {ui | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, γi is not a tautology}. By (ii), X = x is an explanation
of φ relative to CφX=x . Hence, X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ). The
explanatory power of X = x is the sum of all P(ui)= 2i−1/∑k−1j=0 2j with i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
such that γi is not a tautology. ✷
Appendix C. Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.1 (continued). Hardness for P4 is shown by a reduction from the
P4 -complete problem of deciding whether a given QBF Φ = ∀A∃B ∀C ∃Dγ is valid,
where γ is a propositional formula on the variables A= {A1, . . . ,Ak}, B = {B1, . . . ,Bl},
C = {C1, . . . ,Cm}, and D = {D1, . . . ,Dn}. We construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈
D(X), C ⊆ D(U), and φ as in the statement of the theorem such that X = x is an
explanation of φ relative to C iff Φ is valid.
We define the exogenous variables by U = B ∪ {U0,U1,U1′, . . . ,Uk,Uk ′}, where
D(S) = {0,1} for all S ∈ U . We define the set of contexts by C = {u ∈D(U) | (ε0 ∨ ε1 ∨
ε2)(u)}, where:
ε0 =U0 = 0∧
k∧
i=1
(Ui = 0∧Ui ′ = 0),









(Uj = 0∧Uj ′ = 0)
)
,
ε2 =U0 = 1∨
k∨
i=1
(Ui = 1∧Ui ′ = 1).
We define M = (U,V,F ) as follows. We define V = A ∪ A′ ∪ C ∪D ∪ {X0,E,E′, Y },
where A′ = {A1′, . . . ,Ak ′}, D(S) = {0,1,2} for all S ∈ D, and D(S) = {0,1} for all
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where γ ′ is obtained from γ by replacing each S ∈ A ∪ B ∪ C ∪D by “S = 1”. We are
now ready to define the functions F = {FS | S ∈ V } as follows:
• FAi =Ui and FAi ′ =Ui ′ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},• FX0 =U0, and FS = 0 for all S ∈C ∪ {E,E′},
• FS =X0 +E for all S ∈D,
• FY = 1 iff φ′ is true.
Let X =A∪A′ ∪ {X0}, and let x ∈D(X) be given by x(S)= 0 for all S ∈X. Let φ be
Y = 1. Notice that φ is primitive. We now show that Φ is valid iff X = x is an explanation
of φ relative to C .
We first show that EX1, EX2, and EX4 always hold. As φ(u) for all u ∈ C , EX1 always
holds. For every u ∈ C with X(u) = x , it holds ε0(u). Hence, X = x is a weak cause of
φ under every u ∈ C with X(u) = x . That is, also EX2 always holds. As some u,u′ ∈ C
exist such that X(u)= x and X(u′) = x , also EX4 always holds. It thus remains to show
that Φ is valid iff EX3 holds. Recall that EX3 says that for every X′ ⊂ X, some u ∈ C
exists such that (i) X′(u) = x|X′ and (ii) X = x|X′ is not a weak cause of φ under u. If
X0 /∈X′ or X′ ∩ {Ai,Ai ′} = ∅ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then (i) and (ii) hold for some u ∈ C
with ε2(u). If X0 ∈X′, X′ ∩ {Ai,Ai ′} = ∅ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and Ai,Ai ′ ∈X′ for some
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then (i) and (ii) hold for some u ∈ C with ε1(u).
It thus remains to show that Φ is valid iff for every X′ ⊂ X such that (a) X0 ∈X′ and
(b) |X′ ∩ {Ai,Ai ′}| = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, some u ∈ C exists such that (i) X′(u)= x|X′
and (ii) X′ = x|X′ is not a weak cause of φ under u.
For all truth assignments σ and τ to the variables in A and B , respectively,
denote by [A/σ(A), B/τ(B)] the substitution [A1/σ(A1), . . . ,Ak/σ(Ak),B1/τ(B1), . . . ,
Bl/τ (Bl)], and we define ασ,τ = α [A/σ(A),B/τ(B)]. Let x0 = 0, and let u ∈D(U) such
that X0(u)= x0. Then, X0 = x0 is a weak cause of ασ,τ under u iff ∃C ∀D¬γ [A/σ(A),
B/τ(B)] is valid [14,18]. That is, X0 = x0 is not a weak cause of ασ,τ under u
iff ∀C ∃Dγ [A/σ(A),B/τ(B)] is valid. Thus, Proposition 2.5 implies the following
fact:
(∗) For every X′ ⊆ A ∪ A′ ∪ {X0} with X0 ∈ X′, it holds that X′ = X′(u) is not a weak
cause of ασ,τ under u iff ∀C ∃Dγ [A/σ(A),B/τ(B)] is valid.
(⇒) Assume that Φ is valid. Let X′ ⊂ X such that (a) and (b) holds. Define the
truth assignment σ to the variables in A by σ(Ai) = 0 iff Ai ∈ X′ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
As Φ is valid, there exists a truth assignment τ to the variables in B such that
∀C ∃Dγ [A/σ(A),B/τ(B)] is valid. Let x ′ = x|X′, and let u ∈ D(U) be arbitrary such
that X′(u) = x ′, ε1(u), and u(Bi) = τ (Bi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. By (∗), X′ = x ′ is not a
weak cause of ασ,τ under u. We now show that X′ = x ′ is also not a weak cause of φ under
u. Towards a contradiction, assume the contrary. Thus, some W ⊆ V \ X′, x¯ ′ ∈ D(X′),
and w ∈ D(W) exist such that ¬φx¯ ′w(u) and φx ′wzˆ(u) for all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X′ ∪ W) and
zˆ = Ẑ(u). As ¬φx¯ ′w(u), it follows that F ∈ W and w(F) = 1. As φx ′w(u), for every
S ∈ (A ∪ A′) \ X′, it holds either S(u) = 1 or S ∈ W and w(S) = 1. As ¬φx¯ ′w(u), it
thus follows that x¯ ′(S) = 0 for all S ∈ X′ \ {X0}. Hence, ¬αx¯ ′w(u) and αx ′wzˆ(u) for all
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Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X′ ∪W) and zˆ= Ẑ(u). That is, ¬ασ,τ′ (u) and ασ,τ′ (u) for all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X′ ∪W)x¯ w x wzˆ
and zˆ = Ẑ(u). As X′(u) = x ′ and ασ,τ (u), this shows that X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of
ασ,τ under u. Equivalently, by (∗), ∀C ∃Dγ [A/σ(A),B/τ(B)] is not valid, which is a
contradiction. This shows that X′ = x ′ is not a weak cause of φ under u.
(⇐) Assume that Φ is not valid. That is, there is a truth assignment σ to the
variables in A such that for every truth assignment τ to the variables in B , it holds that
∀C ∃Dγ [A/σ(A),B/τ(B)] is not valid. Let X′ = {X0} ∪ {S ∈ A | σ(S) = 0} ∪ {S′ ∈
A′ | σ(S) = 1}, and let x ′ = x|X′. Let u ∈ C be any context such that X′(u) = x ′. We
now show that X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of φ under u. If ε0(u), then X′ = x ′ is trivially
a weak cause of φ under u. Assume now ε1(u). Let τ be the truth assignment to the
variables in B with u(Bi) = τ (Bi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. As ∀C ∃Dγ [A/σ(A),B/τ(B)]
is not valid, by (∗), X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of ασ,τ under u. Thus, some W ⊆ V \X′,
x¯ ′ ∈D(X′), andw ∈D(W) exist such that¬ασ,τ
x¯ ′w(u) and α
σ,τ
x ′wzˆ(u) for all Ẑ ⊆ V \(X′ ∪W)
and zˆ = Ẑ(u). Here, we can assume that x¯ ′(X0) = 1, x¯ ′(S) = 0 for all S ∈ X′ \ {X0},
{F }∪((A∪A′)\X′)⊆W , andw(S)= 1 for all S ∈ {F }∪((A∪A′)\X′). Hence,¬αx¯ ′w(u)
and αx ′wzˆ(u) for all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X′ ∪W) and zˆ = Ẑ(u). Thus, ¬φx¯ ′w(u) and φx ′wzˆ(u) for
all Ẑ ⊆ V \ (X′ ∪W) and zˆ= Ẑ(u). As X′(u)= x ′ and φ(u), it follows that X′ = x ′ is a
weak cause of φ under u. ✷
Theorem C.1. Explanation is P3 -complete for succinct context sets and binary causal
models.
Proof. As for membership in P3 , recall that X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C
iff EX1–EX4 hold. As argued in the proof of Theorem 5.1, deciding whether EX1 and
EX4 hold is in co-NP and NP, respectively, for succinct context sets. By Theorem 2.6,
deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under some u ∈D(U) is in NP in the binary
case. Thus, in EX2, deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C with
X(u) = x is in P2 for succinct context sets and binary causal models. Hence, deciding
whether some X′ ⊂X exists such X′ = x|X′ is a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C with
X′(u)= x|X′ is in P3 for succinct context sets and binary causal models. Thus, deciding
whether EX3 holds is in P3 . In summary, deciding whether EX1–EX4 hold is in 
P
3 for
succinct context sets and binary causal models.
Hardness for P3 is shown by a reduction from the 
P
3 -complete problem of deciding
whether a given QBF Φ = ∀A∃B ∀C γ is valid, where γ is a propositional formula on
the variables A = {A1, . . . ,Ak}, B = {B1, . . . ,Bl}, and C = {C1, . . . ,Cm}. We construct
M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), C ⊆ D(U), and φ as required such that X = x is an
explanation of φ relative to C iff Φ is valid. The construction is similar to the one in the
proof of Theorem 5.1. Roughly, we replace the part for P2 -hardness of deciding general
weak cause by a new part for NP-hardness of deciding binary weak cause.
We define the exogenous variables by U = B ∪ {U0,U1,U1′, . . . ,Uk,Uk ′}, where
D(S) = {0,1} for all S ∈ U . We define the set of contexts by C = {u ∈D(U) | (ε0 ∨ ε1 ∨
ε2)(u)}, where:
ε0 =U0 = 0∧
k∧
i=1
(Ui = 0∧Ui ′ = 0),
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k∨(( ′ ′ )ε1 =U0 = 0∧
i=1




(Uj = 0∧Uj ′ = 0)
)
,
ε2 =U0 = 1∨
k∨
i=1
(Ui = 1∧Ui ′ = 1).
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) as follows. The exogenous variables are given
by V = A ∪ A′ ∪ C ∪ {X0,E′, Y }, where A′ = {A1′, . . . ,Ak ′} and D(S) = {0,1} for all
S ∈ V . Let
α =X0 = 0∨ γ ′,



















where γ ′ is obtained from γ by replacing each S ∈ A ∪ B ∪ C by “S = 1”. We are now
ready to define the functions F = {FS | S ∈ V } as follows:
• FAi =Ui and FAi ′ =Ui ′ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},• FX0 =U0, and FS = 0 for all S ∈C ∪ {E′},
• FY = 1 iff φ′ is true.
Let X = A ∪ A′ ∪ {X0}, and let x ∈ D(X) be given by x(S) = 0 for all S ∈ X.
Let φ be Y = 1. Notice that φ is primitive. For all truth assignments σ and τ to the
variables in A and B , respectively, we denote by [A/σ(A),B/τ(B)] the substitution
[A1/σ(A1), . . . ,Ak/σ(Ak),B1/τ(B1), . . . ,Bl/τ (Bl)], and we define ασ,τ = α [A/σ(A),
B/τ(B)]. Let x0 = 0, and let u ∈ D(U) such that X0(u) = x0. Then, X0 = x0 is a weak
cause of ασ,τ under u iff ∃C¬γ [A/σ(A),B/τ(B)] is valid. That is, X0 = x0 is not a weak
cause of ασ,τ under u iff ∀C γ [A/σ(A), B/τ(B)] is valid. Thus, Proposition 2.5 implies
the following fact:
(∗) For every X′ ⊆ A ∪ A′ ∪ {X0} with X0 ∈ X′, it holds that X′ = X′(u) is not a weak
cause of ασ,τ under u iff ∀C γ [A/σ(A),B/τ(B)] is valid.
Using (∗), by a line of argumentation similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 5.1, it
follows that Φ is valid iff X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C . ✷
Theorem C.2. Partial Explanation is P3 -complete for succinct context sets and binary
causal models.
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Proof. As for membership in P , recall that X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative3
to (C,P ) iff (a) X = x is an explanation of φ relative to CφX=x , and (b) X(u) = x and
P(u) > 0 for some u ∈ CφX=x . By Proposition 4.1, CφX=x is the set of all u ∈ C such that
either (i) X(u) = x , or (ii) X(u)= x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. To check
that (a) holds, we check that EX1–EX4 hold. Clearly, EX1 and EX2 always hold. The
complement of EX3 says that some X′ ⊂ X exists such that for every u ∈ C , it holds that
X′(u) = x|X′ and u ∈ CφX=x implies that X′ = x|X′ is a weak cause of φ under u. That
is, some X′ ⊂ X exists such that for every u ∈ C , it holds either (a) X′(u) = x|X′, or (b)
X(u)= x and X = x is not a weak cause of φ under u, or (c) X′ = x|X′ is a weak cause of
φ under u. By Theorem 2.6, deciding weak cause is in NP in the binary case. Thus, deciding
whether EX3 does not hold is in P3 for succinct context sets and binary causal models.
Hence, deciding whether EX3 holds is in P3 . EX4 says that some u,u′ ∈ CφX=x exist such
that X(u) = x and X(u′)= x . Equivalently, some u,u′ ∈ C exist such that X(u) = x , and
X(u′) = x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u′. Thus, deciding whether EX4 holds
is in NP in the binary case. In summary, deciding whether (a) holds is in P3 for succinct
context sets and binary causal models. Finally, (b) says that some u ∈ C exists such that
X(u)= x , P(u) > 0, and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. Thus, checking (b) is in NP
in the binary case. In summary, deciding whether (a) and (b) holds is in P3 for succinct
context sets and binary causal models.
Hardness for P3 is shown a reduction from the 
P
3 -complete problem of deciding
whether a given QBF Φ = ∀A∃B ∀C γ is valid, where γ is a propositional formula
on the variables A = {A1, . . . ,Ak}, B = {B1, . . . ,Bl}, and C = {C1, . . . ,Cm}. We define
M = (U,V,F ), X⊆ V , x ∈D(X), φ, and C ⊆D(U) as in the proof of Theorem C.1, and
let P be the uniform distribution over C . Observe that φ is primitive and that φ(u) holds
for all u ∈ C . For every u ∈ C , either (i) X(u) = x , or (ii) X(u)= x and X = x is a weak
cause of φ under u. By Proposition 4.1, X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to
(C,P ) iff (a) X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C , and (b) C contains some u such
that X(u)= x and P(u) > 0. Here, (a) implies (b). By the proof of Theorem C.1, X = x is
an explanation of φ relative to C iff Φ is valid. In summary, X = x is a partial explanation
of φ relative to (C,P ) iff Φ is valid. ✷
Appendix D. Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Theorem 6.4 (continued). It remains to prove that Φ is not valid iff (∗) some
u ∈ D(U) exists such that for every u1 ∈ D(U1), there exists a causal formula [Y ←
y]X = x , where Y ⊆ V and X ∈ V , such that (i) (M,u) |= [Y ← y] X = x and (ii)
(M1, u1) |= [Y ← y]X= x .
(⇒) Suppose that Φ is not valid. Let then τ be any truth assignment to B such that
∃C∀Dγ (B/τ(B),C,D) is not valid, that is, ∀C∃D¬γ (B/τ(B),C,D) is valid. Let u
be any context from D(U) such that u(Bi) = τ (Bi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Consider now
any context u1 ∈ D(U1). We then distinguish two cases as follows. (a) If u1(Bi) =
τ (Bi) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, then (M1, u1) |= [W ← τ (B)]Z = 1, while (M,u) |=
[W ← τ (B)]Z = 1, where W ← τ (B) abbreviates W1 ← τ (B1), . . . ,Wl ← τ (Bl).
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(b) If u1(Bi) = τ (Bi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, then some truth assignment τ ′′ to D exists
such that γ (B/τ(B),C/τ ′(C),D/τ ′′(D)) is false, where τ ′ is the truth assignment to C
defined by τ ′(Ci)= u1(Ci) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Hence, (M1, u1) |= [W ← τ (B),D←
τ ′′(D)]Z = 1, while (M,u) |= [W ← τ (B), D← τ ′′(D)]Z = 1. In summary, if Φ is not
valid, then (∗) holds.
(⇐) Suppose that (∗) holds. That is, some u ∈ D(U) exists such that for every
u1 ∈D(U1), there exists a causal formula [Y ← y]X= x , where Y ⊆ V and X ∈ V , such
that (i) (M,u) |= [Y ← y]X = x and (ii) (M1, u1) |= [Y ← y]X = x . In particular, some
u ∈ D(U) exists such that for every u1 ∈ D(U1) with u|B = u1|B , there exists a causal
formula [Y ← y]X = x as above with (i) and (ii). Trivially, (i) and (ii) implies X /∈ Y for
all such u1 ∈D(U1). Moreover, as FX = F 1X = 0 for all X ∈ V \ {Z}, it follows that X =Z
must hold for all such u1 ∈D(U1). It then follows that (M,u) |= [Y← y]Wi = u(Bi) for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, since otherwise (M,u) |= [Y← y]Z = 1 and (M1, u1) |= [Y ← y]Z =
1, for all u1 ∈ D(U1) with u|B = u1|B . This also shows that we have (M,u) |= [Y ←
y]Z = 1 and that (M1, u1) |= [Y ← y] Z = 1, and, moreover, that x = 1 must hold, for
all u1 ∈D(U1) with u|B = u1|B . It then follows that for every truth assignment τ ′ to C
defined by τ ′(Ci) = u1(Ci) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there exists a truth assignment τ ′′ to
D which is defined by (M1, u1) |= [Y ← y]Di = τ ′′(Di) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that
γ (B/τ(B),C/τ ′(C), D/τ ′′(D)) is false, where the truth assignment τ to B is defined
by τ (Bi) = u1(Bi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. This shows that ∃B∀C∃D¬γ is valid. That is,
Φ = ∀B∃C∀Dγ is not valid. ✷
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